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ASSESSING INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTION 132 AFTER TWENTY YEARS
Wayne M. Gazur*
In 1984, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code section 132 to
bring more certainty to the taxation of employee fringe benefits. This
article examines the impact of the legislation from the standpoint of
administrative pronouncements and taxpayer litigation. The article
concludes that section 132 has produced little litigation, but primarily
because it has played the role of increasing exclusions. It remains
unclear whether section 132 has also contained the growth of new forms
of nonstatutory fringe benefits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(DRA 1984),1 Congress at last addressed the federal income taxation
treatment of nonstatutory fringe benefits,2 an area that had been
shaped by administrative pronouncements of the Internal Revenue
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Robert M. Phillips, Esq. in
reviewing an early draft of this article and the research assistance of Sarah Croog.
1 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 [hereinafter
DRA 1984] (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C.).
2 In this context "nonstatutory fringe benefits" exclude compensation items for
which the income tax treatment is governed by specific sections of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) other than section 132, the focus of this article. The
"statutory" fringe benefits include employer-provided health care benefits, see I.R.C.
§§ 105, 106, qualified retirement plans, see I.R.C. § 401, meals or housing provided for
the convenience of the employer, see I.R.C. § 119, education assistance, see I.R.C.
§§ 117(d), 127, and group-term life insurance, see I.R.C. § 79.
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Service (Service)3 punctuated by judicial oversight.4
The legislative history of DRA 1984 identified two competing
objectives of the legislation. The first objective was to "codify the
ability of employers to continue [certain fringe benefits] practices
without imposition of income or payroll taxes."5 The second objective
was to "set forth clear boundaries for the provision of tax-free
benefits."6 The legislative history also expressed the concern "that
without any well-defined limits on the ability of employers to
compensate their employees tax-free by using a medium other than
cash, new practices will emerge that could shrink the income tax base
significantly, and further shift a disproportionate tax burden to those
individuals whose compensation is in the form of cash."7
DRA 1984 aimed to achieve those objectives through three
statutory changes. First, a new section 132 supplied 8 a comprehensive
list of specific fringe benefits excluded from income and general
authority for excluding de minimis fringe benefits.9 Second, the
inclusionary language of section 61(a)(1) was expanded by the
addition of "fringe benefits" as an item of gross income.1° However,
3 The Internal Revenue Service (Service) is one of eleven bureaus in the
Department of the Treasury. Although the Secretary of the Treasury delegates most
revenue functions to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, some matters,
principally the promulgation of regulations, are retained by the Department of the
Treasury but with the active participation of the Service. See generally MICHAEL I.
SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.02[2], 3.01, 3.02[2] (rev. 2d ed. 2004)
(describing role of Service within the Department of the Treasury and the joint
process for development of regulations). This article accordingly uses "Service" in
referring to most matters of tax administration, with the "Treasury Department"
being referred to principally in connection with the promulgation of regulations.
See infra notes 25-104 and accompanying text (describing some of the
administrative pronouncements of the Service and pre-DRA 1984 case law).
H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1591-92 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697,
1215-16.
6 Id.
7 Id. If one employee receives taxable compensation while another receives a
comparable package that is partially tax-free, the principle of horizontal equity is
violated. If higher income employees receive proportionately greater amounts of tax-
free fringe benefit income, the principle of vertical equity could also suffer. See infra
notes 351-53 and accompanying text.
8 Existing section 132 (dealing with statutory cross-references) became section
134 in two steps. See DRA 1984 §§ 531(a)(1) (redesignating section 132 as section
133), 543(a) (redesignating section 133, as newly redesignated by DRA 1984
§ 531(a)(1), as section 134).
9 See I.R.C. § 132(e).
10 DRA 1984 § 531(c). The statute had previously included "commissions, and
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Congress apparently recognized that the broad sweep of section 61 as
interpreted by the courts did not make this addition of the term
"fringe benefits" critical. 11 Third, the employment tax provisions were
amended to expressly include taxable fringe benefits in the wage
base 2
This article examines the Service pronouncements and judicial
activity following the enactment of the DRA 1984 fringe benefit
provisions. The legislation has produced little litigation, but it has
required extensive administrative guidance. It has not significantly
expanded the income tax base and has principally played the role of
increasing exclusions from income and employment taxes. It is
uncertain whether its existence has restrained the development of new
forms of nonstatutory fringe benefits.
Part II presents a brief history of the taxation of nonstatutory
fringe benefits. Part III discusses the trends demonstrated by the
Service pronouncements and judicial activity in the two decades
following enactment of DRA 1984. Part IV assesses the successes and
failures of the legislation. In Part V the article concludes.
II. A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF
NONSTATUTORY FRINGE BENEFITS
A. The Term "Fringe Benefit" Arrives
A leading dictionary in current use identifies the term "fringe
benefit" as of U.S. origin and defines it as "a perquisite or benefit of
some kind provided by an employer to supplement a money wage or
similar items" and with the addition included "commissions, fringe benefits, and
similar items."
11 The House Report observed: "Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that Code section 61 'is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or
financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or
mode by which it is effected."' 1984 HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT,
at 1590, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1214 (quoting Commissioner v. Smith,
324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945)). Footnote one of the House Report embellishes this point:
Similarly, the Court has stated: "Congress applied no limitations as to the
source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature. And the
Court has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in
recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those
specifically exempted."
Id. at 1590 n.1 (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30
(1955)).
12 See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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salary."' 3 However, the term is of relatively recent origin. It did not
appear in the 1948 Webster's dictionary. 14  It was not used in a
published U.S. judicial opinion until 1949." Service pronouncements
as of 1953 were still cautiously referring to "so-called employer-
furnished fringe benefits.,
16
A 1951 edition of a treatise dealing with executive compensation
referred to such benefits as "perquisites"17 using the phrase "'fringe'
increases"'18 only in reference to a limited class of benefits, such as
overtime, vacations, and prizes in war bonds not exceeding $250 in
face value, that could justify a salary increase under the wartime
salary freeze provisions of the Stabilization Act of 1942.'9 The 1962
edition of the treatise embraced the new term, referring to "[f]ringe
benefits, perquisites, health and welfare benefits 20 as new types of
compensation aimed at supplementing fixed salaries, and using the
21
term frequently in the accompanying discussion.
The apparent World War II roots of the term is confirmed by a
1962 London newspaper article reporting the research of a British
economist which found that the term, "fringe benefits," "was
apparently first recorded.., in an announcement by the United States
13 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 200 (2d ed. 1989).
14 See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE - UNABRIDGED (2d ed. 1948). In comparison, the term does appear in
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, where it is defined as "an employment
benefit (as a pension, a paid holiday, or health insurance) granted by an employer
that involves a money cost without affecting basic wage rates." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE - UNABRIDGED
(3rd ed. 1961).
15 See Publishers' Ass'n of N.Y. City v. Simons, 93 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1949).
16 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5404026170A (Apr. 2, 1954); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
5401273580A (Jan. 27, 1954); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5307154520A (Mar. 23, 1953).
17 See GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, II,
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 31-32 (rev. ed. 1951).
8 Id. at 304.
19 Id. at 296-311. The Stabilization Act of 1942 applied from October 2, 1942
until its repeal on November 9, 1946. The definition of "salary" subject to the freeze
excluded reasonable allowances for pension or insurance benefits. Id. at 301 n.101.
20 See 1 GEORGE THOMAS WASHINGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, II,
COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 29 (3rd ed. 1962).
21 Id. at 192-99. The authors divided benefits into "perquisites" as those
"incidental to an executive position and... unavailable to employees generally"
versus "fringe benefits" that are "available to an executive only as one of a group of
employees." Id. at 192-93.
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War Labour Board during the Second World War.
22
Although the wartime wage restrictions origins is now just a
historical footnote, the nontaxable fringe benefit under the current
federal income tax structure remains powerful because it is taxed to
no one - the employer generally receives a deduction to the extent of
expenditures to produce the benefit, 23 and no federal income taxes24 or
employment taxes are imposed on the employee.
B. The Taxation of Nonstatutory Fringe Benefits Prior to DRA 1984
The pre-DRA 1984 income tax treatment of nonstatutory fringe
benefits was a patchwork of Service rulings, surprisingly few
regulations, and a sprinkling of cases. The law reflected custom,
25common sense practicalities, and indirect authority by inference.
Professors Bittker and Lokken summed up the tax status of fringe
benefits before the 1984 legislation as "veiled in uncertainty. 2 6 An
appreciation of these historical themes is necessary to fully understand
the DRA 1984 changes and other facets of the current taxation of
nonstatutory fringe benefits.
1. Tax Reimbursements
Although the term "fringe benefit" may not have been used prior
to the 1940s, the taxation of perquisites became a very visible issue in
the early years of the modern income tax on the administrative front
2 7
and in the courts. For example, in 1929, the U.S. Supreme Court held
2 Fringe Benefits, TIMES (London), Nov. 12, 1962, at 11.
23 This would not be the case with some benefits, such as an employee discount,
for which the employer may deduct only the cost of the goods or service.
24 States may use the federal income tax base, albeit with modifications, for the
computation of state levies, so a federal fringe benefit exclusion can provide income
tax benefits at the state level as well.
25 For example, the primary authority for the employee's income tax treatment
of fringe benefits was found in treasury regulations addressing the employer's
withholding duties. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
26 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFrs 63.1.1 (rev. 3d ed. Supp. 2005).
27 The Service was quite active in issuing rulings addressing nonstatutory fringe
benefits, including: a 1920 ruling concerning meal money, see infra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text; a 1921 ruling concerning free employee train travel, see infra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text; a 1919 law opinion concerning employer-
provided term life insurance, see infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text; and a 1919
revenue ruling concerning employer-provided meals and lodging, see O.D. 265, 1 C.B.
71(1919).
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that a corporation's payment of an executive's federal income tax
28
liability constituted additional taxable income to him. Tax
reimbursement plans, also known as "gross-up 2 9 payments, remain a
current compensation technique. °
2. Meal Money
One of the enduring Service pronouncements dealing with fringe
benefits was O.D. 514,3" that was issued in 1920 and continued to
create interpretative problems for the next sixty years. It held that
occasional cash meal allowances were excluded from taxable income.
In the early 1970s the Service vacillated about the position it had
staked out. For example, in a 1971 general counsel memorandum the
proposed action was a prospective revocation of O.D. 514 because
"[t]he important objective is that something finally be done to remove
this troublesome O.D. once and for all.",12 O.D. 514 remained in
place, and the Service awkwardly addressed the issue by changing its
litigating position in 1973 such that the exclusion applied only if the
meal money was paid on account of overtime work and on an
irregular basis.33
During the 1970s the Treasury Department was grinding out
34
various fringe benefit regulations proposals. In 1975, it issued a
discussion draft of fringe benefit regulations that in part addressed the
28 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
29 "Lest he have to pay income tax on this largess himself, Home Depot will
cover the bill with what's called a gross-up payment." Jerry Useem, Have They No
Shame?, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 2003, at 56, 60 (describing potential severance package if
the Home Depot CEO is terminated).
30 A 1991 treatise referred to Coca-Cola's then-CEO, Roberto Goizueta, as "an
unsung executive compensation frontiersman" for insisting on a full tax
reimbursement for any taxes incurred on restricted stock grants. See GRAEF S.
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 153 (1991). That was simply a variation on the old
tax reimbursement theme from Old Colony Trust, supra note 28, that periodically
surfaced in subsequent Service pronouncements. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-14, 1986-1
C.B. 304 (treating employer's payment of the employee's share of FICA tax as
additional wage income); Rev. Rul. 68-507, 1968-2 C.B. 485 (treating taxes paid by
church for minister other than from salary as additional income). For a contemporary
account of gross-up payment practices, see Mark Maremont, Latest Twist in
Corporate Pay: Tax-Free Income for Executives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2005, at Al.
31 O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920).
32 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,596 (Aug. 30, 1971).
33 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,320 (Apr. 27, 1973).
34 See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
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• 35meal money issue, but the proposals were withdrawn the following
year. A 1976 general counsel memorandum noted that it had been
decided that the 1975 proposed regulations project would be dropped,
36supplanted by new rulings. The general counsel memorandum
proposed a revenue ruling that would require a five-part test of
exclusion for meal money. The meal money would be paid: (1) in
connection with extra, overtime work, (2) infrequently, (3) on an
occasional basis, (4) for reimbursement of actual expenses incurred,
and (5) in a reasonable amount.37 This ruling was not issued, O.D. 514
was not revoked, and the Service litigating position continued to apply
the two-part test of payments for overtime work and on an irregular
38 39basis. As discussed later, in 1978 Congress imposed the first of a
series of moratoria on the issuance of new fringe benefit regulations
or rulings, and that effectively handcuffed the Service from revoking
O.D. 514 until the enactment of DRA 1984.40 The exclusion was
significantly limited in the final section 132 regulations issued in
1989.
41
3. Complimentary Services and Employee Discounts
In 1921, the Service ruled that the value of free train travel for
employees and their families was excluded from income as a gift if the
benefit was "not provided for in the contracts of employment. '' 42 That
35 See 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (Sept. 5, 1975).
36 It was apparently part of the so-called "Eleven Rulings" considered by the
Service at that time, which would have significantly pared back the exclusions for
fringe benefits. See Susan R. Finneran, Fringe Benefit or "Condition of Employment":
Uniformity, Certainty, and Compliance, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 198, 235 n.213 (1983)
(referring generally to the eleven proposed rulings).
37 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,850 (Sept. 15, 1976).
38 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,622 (Mar. 11, 1976).
39 See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
40 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,780 (July 17, 1981) (recounting the change of
position concerning O.D. 514). Also, the general counsel memorandum concluded
that due to the moratorium "revocation of O.D. 514 is precluded at this time." Id.
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(d)(2) (1989).
42 O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921). The travel fringe failed several of the indicia of
an excludable gift subsequently identified in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278 (1960). The Tax Court observed that "[tihe notion expressed in O.D. 946... that
the free railroad travel for employees and their families represents a corporate 'gift'
seems hardly realistic." Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1014 n.3 (1979), affd
sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981). The
Service ruled that an employer's cash awards for job performance were includible in
the employee's income and could not be excluded as a gift under section 102 or a
[Vol. 25:977
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remained the Service's public guidance into the age of commercial air
travel. Referring to this ruling almost sixty years later, the Tax Court
observed in dicta that "[t]here would not appear to be any difference
as to free airline travel, and we do not understand that any distinction
has been drawn administratively as to the latter., 43 Like taxpayers,
the Tax Court had to resort to analogies for authority.
The employees of railroads were fortunate to be able to rely on
one of the few published rulings. In comparison, the Service's policy
concerning employee discounts for both goods and services was not
stated in the substantive income tax regulations, but had to be
inferred from the wage withholding provisions." Those regulations
stated:
Ordinarily, facilities or privileges (such as entertainment,
medical services, or so-called "courtesy" discounts on
purchases), furnished or offered by an employer to his
employees generally, are not considered as wages subject to
withholding if such facilities or privileges are of relatively
small value and are offered or furnished by the employer
merely as a means of promoting the health, good will,
contentment, or efficiency of his employees.45
prize or award under section 74. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-20-014 (Feb. 11, 1985). That
would still be the case today, as cash awards of this nature would not qualify as an
"employee achievement award" under I.R.C. § 74(c). See infra note 216.
41 Zager, 72 T.C. at 1013 n.2.
44 The taxpayer in Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962), argued that the
withholding regulations supported his claim of an income tax exclusion. Justice
Harlan wrote:
The Government admits that not all "fringe benefits" have been taxed as
income, but it is enough to point out here that the withholding tax analogy
is not perfect, for payments to laid-off employees from company-financed
supplemental unemployment benefit plans are "taxable income" to the
employees although not "wages" subject to withholding.
Id. at 274 n.7. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion also pointed to the income tax
withholding regulation, but as support for the proposition that "le]mployees may
receive from their employers many fringe benefits that are not income." Id. at 280
(Douglas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the pre-DRA 1984 withholding rules
applicable to fringe benefits, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
45 Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(10) (2003) (the applicable part of the
regulations remains unchanged to the current day). The Tax Court referred to this
policy in a 1979 opinion, stating: "[C]ourtesy discounts for employees of retail
establishments, etc. - have traditionally been treated as nontaxable, notwithstanding
the familiar and oft-repeated statement that in considering what is to be included in
20061
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Considering the price of most homes, the requirement that the
fringe benefit be "of relatively small value" apparently was breached
by a builder's proposed five to ten percent employee discount on the
retail price of homes in a 1983 technical advice memorandum.46
Although the taxpayer asserted that "its employee discount policy is
noncompensatory and is used only as a tool for inventory control" the
Service noted that the company in some newspaper advertisements
seeking job applicants listed the discount as an employee benefit.47 In
a similar vein, employee discount provisions enacted with DRA 1984
disallow discounts for "real property.,
48
One of the few cases that can be found dealing with no-
additional-cost services was a 1985 district court case addressing tax
years 1973-78. The case was presented as an employer's refund claim
for employment taxes paid on the value of employee parking and
recreation center memberships.49 The court rejected the taxpayer's
refund claim, implicitly holding that these benefits were taxable
income to the employees. In substance, the employer permitted
certain employees - full-time faculty and administrators - to elect
between receiving their full cash salary, or a lesser amount plus a
variety of fringe benefits to make up the difference, consisting of
parking spaces, recreation center memberships, and tuition payments
for the high school education of the employees' children.
With respect to the parking places and recreation center
memberships, the taxpayer principally relied on the employment tax
regulations discussed above.0 The court rejected the application of
this regulation on several counts. The benefits were not available to
employees "generally",5' as dictated by the regulation, and likewise
gross income Congress intended to use its power to the full extent." Zager, 72 T.C. at
1013-14.
46 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-37-012 (May 25, 1983). In the last paragraph prior
to the conclusion the Service states that "because these amounts are not a relatively
small value, the employee discounts in question do not fall within the courtesy
discounts discussed in the regulations which are not wages for the employment taxes."
Id.
'47 Id.
48 See I.R.C. § 132(c)(4).
49 See Marquette Univ. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
.50 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51 Discrimination for the benefit of corporate officers did not concern the
District Court judge in an earlier case involving preferential free dairy products to
corporate officers, but the taxpayer lost on other grounds. See infra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text. Current section 132 generally does not require nondiscrimination
in connection with working condition and general de minimis fringe benefit fringes.
[Vol. 25:977
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they weren't of "relatively small value." The employer's
recordkeeping for the benefits was also a factor. "The fact that
Marquette considered the costs significant enough to deduct them
from the employees' wages belies its claims that the amounts are de
minimus [sic]." ' 2 Finally, the court reasoned that the benefits were not
"furnished" by the employer, but rather that they were purchased by
the employee, due to the cash or in-kind election.53
4. De Minimis Fringe Benefits
Administratively the Service ignored small, in-kind benefits. The
"turkey and ham" pronouncement, Revenue Ruling 59-58, exempted
the "value of a turkey, ham, or other items of merchandise of similar
nominal value, distributed by an employer to an employee at
Christmas, or a comparable holiday, as part of a general
distribution.., as a means of promoting their good will. ' 54  The
revenue ruling stated that the exemption did not apply to "cash, gift
certificates,55 and similar items of readily convertible cash value,
regardless of the amount involved. 56 Noncash gifts of this type are
also excluded under the current section 132 regulations.
The practical administrative inclination to ignore immaterial
amounts not paid in cash had broad application. Until the addition of
section 79 to the Code in 1964,58 most group-term life insurance
premiums paid by an employer were not included in the employees'
However, no-additional-cost service fringes, employee discounts, employer-provided
eating facilities, and retirement planning services generally include a
nondiscrimination requirement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8 (1989).
52 Marquette Univ., 645 F. Supp. at 1011.
53 Id. Under current I.R.C. § 132(f)(4) an employee is not considered to be in
constructive receipt of a parking benefit even if the employee can choose between
taxable compensation or a tax-free qualified transportation fringe.
54 Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
55 A 1961 district court case ignored the limitations expressed in Revenue Ruling
59-58, finding that gift certificates of $15 or $25 were not taxable wages for employer
wage withholding purposes. See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. United States, 200 F. Supp.
847 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
56 Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17, 18.
57 "Examples of de minimis fringe benefits are.., traditional birthday or holiday
gifts of property (not cash) with a low fair market value." Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1)
(1992). The Service has continued to assert that cash or cash equivalents, including
gift certificates, cannot be excluded as a de minimis fringe benefit. See infra notes
211-13 and accompanying text.
58 See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 204(a)(1), 78 Stat. 19, 36
(1964) (adding section 79).
2006]
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income. 9 Group-term life insurance that had no cash value was not
considered as bestowing a taxable economic benefit on the employee,
although a cash surrender value could produce taxable income to the
employee.60 A 1919 Service law opinion established this generous
doctrine, reasoning that the employee benefited during life "only in
the feeling of contentment that provision has been made for
dependents. It is paid by the employer not as compensation to the
employee, but as an investment in increased efficiency. 6 ' This benign
treatment probably reflected the Code's general deference toward life
62
insurance in encouragement of family protection.
However, some taxpayers did test the boundaries of this largely
uncharted area and did not prevail. For example, the taxpayer in
Harmony Dairy Co. v. Commissioner6 followed a practice of
delivering dairy products free of charge to its officer-stockholders.
Rejecting the taxpayer's "claim that these free products were in the
nature of fringe benefits," 6 the court denied a deduction for the
products. The troublesome issue for the court apparently was not the
discriminatory aspect of the fringe benefit,6' but rather its role as aconstructive dividend distribution.66
5. Working Condition Fringes
Section 132 now excludes "working condition fringes" defined as
''any property or services provided to an employee of the employer to
59 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5404026170A (Apr. 2, 1954) (applying this
doctrine).
60 The rationale for this treatment was explained in Mimeo. 6477, 1950-1 C.B.
16, which limited the exclusion if a current cash value was present.
61 0. 1014, 2 C.B. 88, 89 (1920).
62 See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur, Death and Taxes: The Taxation of Accelerated
Death Benefits for the Terminally Ill, 11 VA. TAX REV. 263, 299-326 (1991) (discussing
policies underlying the taxation of life insurance).
63 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (1960).
64 Id. at 588.
65 In Marquette University v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Wis. 1985),
discussed supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text, the court found that the
discriminatory application of the benefit violated the language of the withholding tax
regulation.
6" "[O]ur immediate concern is whether the products were received free-of-
charge because of the recipient's executive position, or because of his status of
stockholder. In case of the latter, respondent well may be correct in contending the
value of these products constituted a distribution of earnings and profits." Harmony
Dairy Co., 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 589.
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the extent that, if the employee paid for such property or services,
such payment would be allowable as a deduction under section 162 or
167." 67 Essentially, the statute dispenses with an income inclusion for
the employer's payment if it could be matched by a hypothetical
offsetting employee deduction for the same amount, producing a so-
68called "wash" for income tax purposes.
A specialized application of this "working condition fringe"
principle in pre-DRA 1984 law was a corporation's payment of its
officers' attorney fees and fines. For example, in Central Coat, Apron
& Linen Service, Inc. v. United States,69 the court permitted a
corporation to deduct legal fees for the defense of its president for
alleged criminal violations of the Sherman AntiTrust Act. In dicta the
court noted that the officer could have deducted the legal fees if paid
by himself, "as long as they are incurred in defending activities related
to the business of the corporation and not to personal frolics.,
70
Although the opinion did not hold that the officer would not report
income on account of the indemnity, it is arguably implied, and later
71Service rulings confirm that.
Foreshadowing current section 132(d)'s confinement of offsetting
employee expenses to those allowable under sections 162 or 167,
Revenue Ruling 73-137' required a corporate executive to include in
gross income an amount equal to the value of personal financial
advice received from professional consultants hired by his employer,
even though the ruling concluded that the executive was entitled to an
67 I.R.C. § 132(d).
68 In describing instances of judicial recognition of nonstatutory exclusions from
gross income the Service referred to several cases that "illustrate the 'wash' result
type of nonstatutory exclusions." I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,456 (Mar. 15, 1971);
see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,278 (Sept. 30, 1977) ("[T]he company need not
withhold taxes on these payments because the company could reasonably expect that
the Code § 162 deductions would wash out the effect of including the payments in the
employees' gross incomes.").
69 298 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
5.04[5] (7th ed. 2000) (discussing the income tax treatment of the corporation,
directors, officers, and shareholders with respect to indemnity agreements).
70 Central Coat, 298 F. Supp. at 1203.
71 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-491, 1969-2 C.B. 22 (corporation can deduct premiums
for officer errors and omissions insurance and the officers recognize no income on
account of the payments). Professors Bittker and Eustice refer to I.R.C.
section 132(d) as support for an exclusion from income for the corporate officer. See
BITTrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 69, at 5.04[5] n.115.
72 1973-1 C.B.42.
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offsetting deduction, but under section 212.73
Prior to the enactment of DRA 1984, commentators generally
referred to these types of noncompensatory benefits as "working
conditions, 74 or "conditions of employment."75  Some working
conditions, such as the "factory roof over the industrial worker's
head, 76 were, and are, not considered income, as the compensatory or
employee personal benefit element is remote. However, others, such
as employer-provided income tax preparation7  or travel and
entertainment, may demonstrate a mix of business and personal
factors, such that a total exclusion is not allowed. The messy mixture
73 I.R.C. section 132 was amended in 2001 by the addition of subsection 132(m)
that provides an exclusion for retirement planning advice or information provided to
an employee and his spouse by any employer maintaining a qualified retirement plan.
See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 665(b), 115 Stat. 38, 143 (2001). The Service fringe benefits publication states that
"the exclusion does not apply to services for tax preparation, accounting, legal, or
brokerage services." INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 15-B, EMPLOYER'S TAX
GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS 14 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/pl5b.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE].
74 See, e.g., JOSEPH T. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 101-06
(1967). In 1919, the Service allowed an exclusion for meals and lodging provided to
seamen, because the meals and lodging was provided "for the convenience of the
employer." O.D. 265, 1 C.B. 71 (1919). That doctrine shares some common ground
with the "working condition" doctrine.
75 See, e.g., Finneran, supra note 36, at 225 (providing examples of "conditions of
employment" such as water coolers, air conditioners, office furnishings, and parking).
76 SNEED, supra note 74, at 101.
77 See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-47-003 (July 31, 1985) (employer-
provided income tax preparation service was taxable income to the employee, even
though employer required the employee's income tax return to compute an overseas
tax reimbursement but the employee could decline the employer-provided
preparation). I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Sept. 14, 2001), available at 2001 WL
1077144, addresses a similar factual situation, except that the expatriate employees
had to agree to have their host country and U.S. income tax returns prepared by the
professional services company. The Service still considered this as income to the
employee:
[E]very individual is required to file an individual federal income tax return
yearly.... The primary benefit of the tax preparation services thus inures
to the expatriate employees, not to the Company.... The Company could
inspect the expatriate employees' filed returns in order to determine the
appropriate cost equalization adjustment without paying for tax return
preparation.
Id. The facts of this Field Service Advisory are very similar to an earlier nondocketed
service advice review. See I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review 10,795 (July 1,
1999), available at 1999 WL 33910796.
20061 Internal Revenue Code Section 132
of the employer's business purpose and the employee's personal
enjoyment produce popular law school casebook examples such as
Rudolph v. United States,8 in which the government prevailed, and
United States v. Gotcher,"9 in which the taxpayer prevailed, on roughly
similar facts.8°
This type of controversy has not disappeared in the post-DRA
811984 era. A 2003 case, Townsend Industries, Inc. v. United States,
involved an annual employee fishing trip. Although the trial court
and the appellate court differed in their views of the facts, attendance
at the event apparently was not required by the employer, but it was
strongly urged. Spouses were not invited. The two-day event was
held at a Canadian resort, at the terminus of a day-long bus ride from
Iowa. It probably is fair to say that except for avid fishermen or bus
78 370 U.S. 269 (1962). The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed a writ of certiorari,
preserving the holdings of the lower courts that a week-long gathering of life
insurance salesmen and their spouses was provided by the employer for the "primary
purpose of affording a pleasure trip ... in the nature of a bonus reward, and
compensation for a job well done... primarily a pleasure trip in the nature of a
vacation." Id. at 270 (quoting the language of the district court in Rudolph v. United
States, 189 F. Supp. 2, 4-5 (N.D. Tex. 1960)). In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice
Harlan explained that the taxpayer sought to "characterize the amount as a 'fringe
benefit' not specifically excluded from § 61 by other sections of the statute, yet not
intended to be encompassed by its reach." Id. at 273-74 (Harlan, J., separate op.).
While Justice Harlan would "[c]onced[e] that the statutory exclusions from 'gross
income' are not exhaustive ... it is not now necessary to explore the extent of any
such nonstatutory exclusions. For it was surely within the Commissioner's
competence to consider as 'gross income' a 'reward, or a bonus given to...
employees for excellence in service,' which the District Court found was the
employer's primary purpose in arranging this trip." Id. at 274. Justice Harlan's
opinion also explained that an offsetting business deduction could not be claimed by
the taxpayer because the trip was primarily personal.
79 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated a
jury verdict in favor of the taxpayer that had been vacated by the presiding judge.
Mr. Gotcher, an employee of an automobile dealership, and his wife enjoyed a trip to
Germany, the cost of which was shared by Gotcher's employer and Volkswagen. The
court concluded that existing doctrine would exclude the value of such a trip from Mr.
Gotcher's income (but not that portion applicable to Mrs. Gotcher) as it was
primarily for the employer's benefit. Id.
80 In a 1977 general counsel memorandum dealing with a life insurance company
convention and facts remarkably similar to those in Rudolph, the Service treated the
convention expenses paid by the employer as nontaxable to the employees because it
could be reasonably expected by the employer that the employees could claim an
offsetting business expense deduction. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,278 (Sept. 30,
1977).
81 342 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2003), rev'g No. Civ. 4-01-CV-10176, 2002 WL 31367977
(S.D. Iowa Aug. 21, 2002).
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travelers, this doesn't sound like a highly enjoyable time. The Service
nevertheless asserted that the employees received taxable wages, and
sought an employment tax deficiency against the employer.
The District Court judge applied section 132's required analysis of
whether the trip would have been an ordinary and necessary business
expense if it had been paid for by the employees.82 The trial court
concluded that the "lax attendance policy" 3 and the lack of organized
business meetings for most employees failed the test, so the benefit
was taxable to the employees. However, the appellate court accepted
the taxpayer's account of assorted business discussions conducted at
the retreat, finding for the taxpayer.
6. The Special Case of Shareholder Loans
Below-market loans to employees and shareholders were a
significant tax-free nonstatutory fringe benefit that produced no
imputed income to the borrower. 84 A part of DRA 1984 beyond the
scope of this article, current section 7872, 8' answers most of the
income tax issues. Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 corporate
reform legislation placed additional limits on most loans from publicly
traded corporations to officers and directors.86
7. Use of Employer Automobiles, Airplanes, Yachts...
Although the Service was unsuccessful in convincing the courts
that a broad reading of section 61 should produce income to a
borrower in a below-market loan arrangement, the Service was much
more successful in taxing the use of tangible assets. Employee or
shareholder use of employer or corporate-owned assets for personal
As a matter of doctrine, Professor Sneed's industrial worker noted in the text
accompanying supra note 76 now may need to claim a hypothetical deduction for the
roof over his or her head, even though it is so clearly offered solely for the employer's
business purposes, without any compensatory purpose.
83 Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, No. Civ. 4-01-CV-10176, 2002 WL
31367977 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 21, 2002).
84 The Tax Court made the fringe benefit analogy. "It may be noted that the
economic benefits accruing to the stockholder-officer-employee by reason of an
interest-free loan are somewhat akin to many fringe benefits that have been enjoyed
without tax incidence since 1913." Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009, 1013 (1979),
affd sub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
85 See DRA 1984 § 172(a) (codified as I.R.C. § 7872).
86 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402(a), 116
Stat. 745, 787-88 (2002).
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purposes was generally found to produce compensation income or
constructive dividend treatment, depending upon the context.
Inadequate entertainment logs or other recordkeeping to establish
business use is a common feature. 7 As discussed in the next section,
recordkeeping and other issues surrounding the use of employer-
provided vehicles dominate the current fringe benefit taxation
landscape.88
8. Employment Taxes
The withholding rules for fringe benefits that applied to
employers did not neatly correspond to the employee's income tax
treatment of the items. For example, in 1978, the Supreme Court held
in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States 9 that although
the employee cash meal allowances in question were properly
included in the employees' income, 90 the employer was not sufficiently
on notice to be required to withhold income taxes.9'
The withholding rules for fringe benefits were not otherwise
internally consistent. In 1981, the Supreme Court held a regulation
requiring Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) withholding for meals and lodging,
87 See, e.g., Gardner v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1980) (constructive
dividend for use of corporate-owned automobile); United Aniline Co. v.
Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1963) (constructive dividend for use of
corporate yacht); Beckley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 235 (1975)
(constructive dividend for use of corporate-owned airplane); Int'l Artists, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 94 (1970), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 1 (constructive dividend for
entertainer Liberace's use of corporate-owned home). A statutory exception beyond
the scope of this article is section 119, which can be applied to exclude the value of
employer-provided meals or lodging. See Karla W. Simon, Fringe Benefits and Tax
Reform Historical Blunders and a Proposal for Structural Change, 36 U. FLA. L. REV.
871, 896-903 (1984) (in-depth discussion of the history of section 119).
88 See infra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.
89 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
90 The taxpayer paid certain employees $1.40 for each noon lunch consumed
away from normal duty stations on nonovernight trips. Some salaried employees
were reimbursed for actual lunch expenses up to a specified maximum. Id. at 22. The
case was decided in the same term in which the Court ruled that lunch
reimbursements to highway patrol officers were included in income. See
Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
91 "To require the employee to carry the risk of his own tax liability is not the
same as to require the employer to carry the risk of the tax liability of its employee.
Required withholding, therefore, is rightly much narrower than subjectability to
income taxation." Central Illinois, 435 U.S. at 29.
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but excluding those amounts from income tax withholding, invalid in
92Rowan Cos. v. United States. As discussed in the next section, the
employer's liability for employment taxes, rather than the employees'
direct income tax liability, remains the dominant issue in the reported
cases and administrative pronouncements.93
9. The Regulations Projects and the Moratorium
In 1975, the Treasury issued proposed regulations dealing with
nonstatutory fringe benefits. 94 Encountering widespread criticism, 9' it
withdrew the proposed regulations the next year.96 In 1978, Congress
responded with a moratorium until December 31, 1979 on the
issuance of regulations, rulings, or procedures 97 that would
significantly alter the historic treatment of fringe benefits. 98 In the
interim a special task force conducted hearings and produced a draft
bill.99 The legislation did not move forward, and Congress extended
the moratorium until May 31, 1981. In January 1981, during the
second moratorium, the Service issued a "discussion draft" for new
proposed regulations. Congress responded by again extending the
92 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
93 See infra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
94 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118, 41,119 (Sept. 5, 1975).
95 "Caught in a heated cross fire between critics who found the proposed
regulations too lenient and those who thought they were too severe, the Treasury
withdrew its draft in 1976." 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 26, at 63.1.1.
% See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,334 (Dec. 28, 1976).
97 The statute referred only to regulations, but the legislative history indicates
that it was the intent of Congress "that the Treasury Department will not alter, or
deviate from, in any significant way the historical treatment of fringe benefits through
the issuance of revenue rulings or revenue procedures, etc." H.R. REP. No. 95-1232,
at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2510. This language was interpreted
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as simply cautionary to the
Service beyond the issuance of regulations and did not restrain judicial action with
respect to fringe benefit questions. See Knapp v. Commissioner, 870 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.
1989). In the same litigation, the Tax Court had held that the moratorium did not
bind the court, and the court, in turn, had no authority to enjoin the Service. See
Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430 (1988).
98 See Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996 (1978).
99 See STAFF OF TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS, H. COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT BILL AND REPORT ON
EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS (Comm. Print 1979).
100 See Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275, 1275 (1979).
101 The discussion draft was not formally proposed as regulations, so it cannot be
found in the Federal Register. It was reprinted in secondary authorities. See, e.g.,
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moratorium through December 31, 1983. °2 When the moratorium
expired, the Service announced that it would refrain from issuing any
rulings or determination letters until after January 1, 1985.23 The area
of nonstatutory fringe benefits was ripe for some solution,1' 4 and
Congress introduced a comprehensive treatment with DRA 1984 that
was signed by President Reagan on July 18, 1984.
III. OBSERVED TRENDS IN THE AFTERMATH OF DRA 1984
This section will discuss the administrative and judicial activity
following the amendment to section 61(a)(1) and the enactment of
section 132 as part of DRA 1984. Although the treasury regulations
will be addressed only as necessary for the discussion, the detail-. - 105
oriented nature of the regulations will nevertheless emerge.
Fringe Benefits: Treasury Sends Draft Proposals on Fringe Benefits to Rostenkowski,
Daily Exec. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at G-7, J-14 (Jan. 16, 1981).
102 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 801, 95 Stat.
172, 349 (1981) (extending the moratorium through December 31, 1983).
103 See I.R.S. Announcement 84-5, 1984-4 I.R.B. 31; Rev. Proc. 84-14, 1984-1 C.B.
431 (effective January 1, 1984, the Service was no longer prohibited by statute from
issuing rulings or determination letters in the fringe benefits area, but it would refrain
from issuing rulings or determination letters until after January 1, 1985). Section 132
as enacted by DRA 1984 was not effective until January 1, 1985. At the time of the
enactment of DRA 1984, the Service had already issued Announcement 84-5. To be
certain, however, Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways
and Means, stated: "The conferees intend, however, that the Treasury will follow
present practice in this area until the new provisions become effective on January 1,
1985." 130 CONG. REC. H 7085, 7112 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2140,
2143.
104 The history of the various fringe benefit proposals is much more detailed than
suggested by this abbreviated account. For a detailed description of the various
Service proposals in the years leading up to DRA 1984, see Finneran, supra note 36.
105 The roughly fifty pages of the section 132 regulations supply the primary
substance of the rules for the taxation of nonstatutory fringe benefits. See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.132-0 (as amended in 2001); 1.132-1 (as amended in 1993); 1.132-2 (1989); 1.132-3
(1989); 1.132-4 (1989); 1.132-5 (as amended in 2001); 1.132-6 (as amended in 1992);
1.132-7 (1989); 1.132-8(1989); 1.132-9 (2001). However, resolution of the full
treatment of items often requires reference to other regulations, notably Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-21 (as amended in 1992) (taxation of fringe benefits); § 1.62-2 (as amended in
2003) (accountable plans); § 1.119-1 (as amended in 1985) (meals and lodging for the
convenience of the employer); § 1.274-5T (as amended in 2002) (business expense
substantiation rules).
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A. Employment Taxes Remain the Most Important Issue
There are few reported cases in which the Service asserted an
income tax deficiency against the employee.' 6 Most fringe benefits
are apparently spread over a number of employees and that dilutes
Service enforcement efforts against the recipients. Instead, the
Service focuses on the collection of employment taxes from the
employer.' 7  That is probably a more efficient enforcementS108
approach, and it does indirectly shape the structure and employee
treatment of the fringe benefits.'0 9 On the other hand, it has less force
for highly paid employees due to the wage ceilings placed on the
106 There are some exceptions, particularly where the amounts give rise to a
claimed business expense deduction on the employee's income tax return. See, e.g.,
Edmands v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 167 (1989) (Alaskan oil field worker
could not deduct commercial air fares to job sites, which were not reimbursed by the
employer). The Service has announced that it will review executives' income tax
returns when conducting an audit of the corporation. See infra notes 306-07 and
accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2003)
(asserted employment tax deficiency on account of four-day employee fishing trip);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 2d 445 (D.N.J. 1998) (employment
tax deficiency on account of incorrect computation of value of automobile fringe
benefits). Two of the largest fringe benefit cases involved United Airlines and
American Airlines. In UAL Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 7 (2001), the Service
unsuccessfully tried to bar the airline's deduction of an hourly cash per diem
allowance paid to flight attendants and pilots on day trips as well as overnight trips,
claiming that the employees had not satisfied travel substantiation requirements. In a
related case, United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 722 (2001), the
taxpayer won a refund claim for payroll taxes paid on per diem amounts computed on
the basis of $1.50 per on-duty hour, paid to pilots and flight attendants for both day
and overnight travel. See also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-12-001 (Dec. 13, 1990)
(apparently relating to the United Air Lines litigation). The Service also litigated the
treatment of per diems computed at a dollar rate per duty hour in American Airlines,
Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 712 (1998), affd in part, rev'd in part, 204 F.3d 1103
(Fed. Cir. 2000), where again the issue was an employment tax deficiency.
108 The Service offers an "early referral to appeals" procedure for many tax
issues, specifically including employment tax issues and "whether certain payments
are excepted from the definition of 'wages' (e.g., a fringe benefit that would be
excludable from the employee's gross income under § 132)." Rev. Proc. 99-28, 1999-2
C.B. 109, § 4.03(3). Generally speaking, this procedure permits the taxpayer to
request that selected issues raised in an audit be referred to the Office of Appeals
within the Service before the audit is otherwise complete with respect to the
remaining issues.
109 If the employer determines that a fringe benefit is taxable, the employer will
generally report the amount on Form W-2 (or Form 1099-MISC if the amount is self-
employment income or otherwise not considered "wages").
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imposition of most employment taxes.1 ° A notable exception to this
trend is the treatment of shareholders of closely held corporations,
where the claimed fringe benefit can trigger a constructive dividend..
or fringe benefit income 12 to the shareholder employee.
DRA 1984 sought to clarify some of the inconsistencies between
the income tax inclusion rules, on the one hand, and the income and
employment tax withholding rules, on the other hand, as applied to
10 In 2005, the wages ceiling for the imposition of federal unemployment taxes
on a single employee was $7,000 (paid only by the employer), $90,000 for old-age,
survivors, and disability insurance (paid by both the employer and employee), and
unlimited for the 1.45% Medicare tax (paid by both employer and employee). See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB No. 15 (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE
(2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl5.pdf. In a field service advisory
apparently stemming from the audit of an automobile manufacturer's product testing
program, the taxpayer proposed that it would agree it did not have reasonable cause
for failure to withhold employment taxes "in return for a commitment from the
Service to drop audits of the individual employees' income tax returns." I.R.S. Field
Serv. Advisory (Nov. 21, 1995), available at 1995 WL 1918543. The Service has
recently issued audit guides for executive fringe benefits and has indicated that it will
review executives' income tax returns when it is conducting an audit of the
corporation. See infra notes 306-24 and accompanying text.
n See, e.g., Delaware Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-280 (2004),
available at 2004 WL 2904445 (payments by corporation for the child care expenses of
the shareholder's grandchildren constituted a constructive dividend to him); I.R.S.
Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review 5430 (Feb. 17, 1995), available at 1995 WL
1922072 ("If, as appears to be the case, the three corporate aircraft were available to
all corporate officers, not just the majority or controlling shareholders of the
corporation, it would appear that the benefit was meant as a fringe benefit, and
should not be looked upon as a constructive dividend."). The Service has expressed
some resistance to importing fringe benefit doctrine into the established constructive
dividend jurisprudence because exceptions such as the de minimis fringe benefit
exclusion could reduce the effectiveness of the constructive dividend enforcement
tool. For example, in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,482 (Mar. 5, 1986), the Service
declined to value a constructive dividend at the fair market value of the benefit
bestowed by a corporation's payment of shareholders' brokerage commissions,
content to value the dividend at a pro rata portion of the corporation's costs.
112 See, e.g., Izzo v. Dep't of the Treasury (In re Jett), No. 97-28756-BM, 2000 WL
637322 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2000) (use of $75,000 sports car purchased by
corporation for exclusive use by shareholder held to be fringe benefit compensation
income); Whitehead v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 976 (2001) (shareholder
employee recognized fringe benefit income for use of corporate vehicles by himself
and his wife); Cox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 336 (2001) (failure to
substantiate claimed seventy percent business use of company-owned Ford Explorer
produced fringe benefit income for lease value to the shareholder employee); Badell
v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (2000) (taxpayers required to include fringe
benefit income from personal use of corporate-owned automobiles and corporation's
payment of personal life insurance premiums).
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nonstatutory fringe benefits. 13 It added language expressly including
noncash fringe benefits, not otherwise excluded by section 132, in the
definition of taxable wages for purposes of federal income tax
withholding, FUTA and FICA withholding, and Railroad Retirement
Act withholding."4 It was the expectation of Congress that the
withholding rules for nonstatutory fringe benefits reflect a simple rule
of symmetry.1
1 5
Nevertheless, fringe benefits have continued to present
withholding and employment tax issues. For example, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's opinion in Anderson v. United
States,116 rejected the application of FICA taxes to cash housing
allowances otherwise excluded from gross income,"' according little
effect to DRA 1984's language that apparently included all but section
132 excluded fringe benefits in both the FICA and income tax
withholding wage bases. The court instead argued that "[in context
113 See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prior law.
114 DRA 1984 § 531(d)(5) amended I.R.C. § 3501 by the addition of subsection
3501(b) stating that "[t]he taxes imposed by this subtitle [subtitle C of the Code
dealing with employment taxes] with respect to non-cash fringe benefits shall be
collected (or paid) by the employer at the time and in the manner prescribed by the
Secretary by regulations." DRA 1984 then amended the various employment tax
provisions to expressly address in kind fringe benefits. DRA 1984 § 531(d)(1)(A)
amended I.R.C. § 3121(a) such that wages for purposes of the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act include "all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any
medium." Prior to amendment the language included "all remuneration paid in any
medium." DRA 1984 also included a new paragraph 3121(a)(20) that excepted "any
benefit provided to or on behalf of an employee if at the time such benefit is provided
it is reasonable to believe that the employee will be able to exclude such benefit from
income under section 117 or 132." DRA 1984 § 531(d)(3)-(4) made similar changes
to I.R.C. §§ 3306 (dealing with employer contributions under FUTA) and 3401
(dealing with income tax withholding on wages). DRA 1984 § 531(d)(2) added I.R.C.
§ 3231(e)(5) (dealing with the Railroad Retirement Tax Act) stating "[t]he term
'compensation' shall not include any benefit provided to or on behalf of an employee
if at the time such benefit is provided it is reasonable to believe that the employee will
be able to exclude such benefit from income under section 117 or 132."
15 "[A]ny fringe benefit that does not qualify for exclusion under the bill and
that is not excluded under another statutory fringe benefit provision of the Code is
includible in gross income for income tax purposes, and in wages for employment tax
purposes." H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1169 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1857. Although beyond the scope of this article, there are other
claimed inconsistencies beyond nonstatutory fringe benefits with respect to what is
covered income. See, e.g., Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence:
Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685,693-710 (2002).
16 929 F.2d 648 (Fed. Cir. 1991), affg 16 Cl. Ct. 530 (1989).
"7 See I.R.C. § 912(1)(C) (excluding such allowances from gross income).
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the phrase merely clarifies, as it did in the income tax withholding
provision, that fringe benefits not paid in cash should be treated the
same as fringe benefits paid in cash."118 But, the court did allow that
"the government's position that 'fringe benefits' are taxable under
FICA unless they fall under section 132 may well have validity in the
context of considering other fringe benefits."119
Likewise, in H B & R, Inc. v. United States120 the employer-
provided round-trip commercial airline tickets from the employees'
homes to the North Slope of Alaska on three-week rotations at an
average cost of $1,000 to $1,200 per trip. The court agreed with the
Service that the ticket expense was a nondeductible commuting
expense and therefore taxable income to the employees. However,
the court concluded that the language of a withholding regulation that
exempted "'[a]mounts paid specifically-either as advances or
reimbursements-for traveling.., expenses incurred... in the
business of the employer ' ' ' 121 was equivocal enough to preclude
122
liability by the employer for failure to withhold employment taxes.
One might dismiss these cases as dealing only tangentially with
the scope of section 132 fringe benefits. However, one should expect
employment tax cases to arise even after DRA 1984, because the
employment tax exemption involves the interpretation of whether
section 132 excludes the item.1
3
B. Transportation Issues Predominate
Section 132 and the regulations under section 61 provide
comprehensive rules for the income tax treatment of employee use of
18 Anderson, 929 F.2d at 653.
119 Id. at 654.
120 229 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2000).
1 Id. at 691 (citing Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b) (1990)).
122 The court quoted the Supreme Court's language in Central Illinois Public
Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 32 (1978): "'[n]o employer, in viewing the
regulations.., could reasonably suspect that a withholding obligation existed."' H B
& R, 229 F.3d at 691. The facts of the case resemble those of a 1996 technical advice
memorandum that dealt with an employer's liability for employment taxes on the
fringe benefit. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-41-003 (Oct. 11, 1996); cf Fleet Mgmt.
Servs., Inc. v. United States, C-1-91-052, 1992 WL 420858 (S.D. Ohio May 28, 1992)
(denying a tax refund claim by a long-haul trucking company for FICA taxes withheld
on travel expense allowances).
123 The public utility company in a 1991 technical advice memorandum argued
that the treatment of meal allowances still remained uncertain enough to avoid
employment tax liability. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
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transportation-related fringes. This area is detail-oriented, and it has
generated the greatest amount of administrative guidance. Most of
the revenue rulings issued with respect to nonstatutory fringe benefits
pertain to transportation.14  As demonstrated in the following
paragraphs, taxpayers have become very active in requesting private
letter ruling guidance. The details are not pleasant reading, but one
needs to be immersed in them a bit to appreciate the level of
nitpicking dictated by the regulations.
The section 132 regulations provide detailed guidance concerning
the determination of employee personal usage of employer-provided
vehicles. All of the value of the use of a "qualified nonpersonal use
vehicle" is excluded from gross income as a working condition
fringe.12' That status is important because if it is achieved, income
inclusions from possible personal use, including commuting, are
126ignored. The definition of such vehicles is supplied by the section
274 regulations, and many of the categories are practical and almost
humorously free of question - e.g., ambulances, cement mixers,
combines, cranes and derricks, forklifts, and school buses.
12
1
124 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-97, 1986-2 C.B. 42 (interpreting qualified nonpersonal
use vehicle test for pickup trucks and vans); Rev. Rul. 2004-98, 2004-2 C.B. 664
(rejecting a parking reimbursement arrangement); see also I.R.S. Notice 2004-46,
2004-2 C.B. 46 (request for comments on use of debit cards to provide qualified
transportation fringes); I.R.S. Notice 94-3, 1994-1 C.B. 327 (guidance on parking and
transit passes); I.R.S. Notice 89-110, 1989-2 C.B. 447 (guidance on assorted fringe
benefit issues, but principal focus on employer-provided vehicles and transit passes).
In 1991, the Treasury twice proposed amendments to the section 132 regulations to
address transportation issues. The first set of proposed regulations dealt with the
valuation of transportation furnished by an employer to or from an employee's
workplace due to unsafe conditions surrounding the employee's workplace or
residence and to increase the dollar amount of the de minimis fringe benefit amount
for transit passes. See Taxation of Fringe Benefits and Exclusions from Gross Income
of Certain Fringe Benefits, 56 Fed. Reg. 23,038 (May 20, 1991). A second set of
proposals addressed an exclusion for transportation furnished to government
employees on account of security concerns and clarified the treatment of volunteers
who perform services for exempt organizations. See Taxation of Fringe Benefits and
Exclusions from Gross Income of Certain Fringe Benefits, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,465 (Sept.
25, 1991).
125 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(h) (2001).
126 The qualified nonpersonal use vehicle exemption is quite broad if it applies,
because 100 percent of the use of the vehicle is excluded as a working condition
fringe, without requiring specific application of the commuting expense rules as
announced in Rev. Rul. 99-7, 1999-1 C.B. 361, and Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261.
See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 2000-51-041 (Dec. 22, 2000), available at 2000 WL
33126620 (explaining this rule).
127 See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(k)(2)(ii) (2002). The categories of exempted
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An exception for unmarked law enforcement vehicles 12 has
produced questions about the definition of a law enforcement--. 129. 13
officer. Criminal investigators for a state commission"3 qualified for
the exception. On the other hand, special investigators dealing with
state cigarette tax laws were denied the exemption because they failed
to carry firearms. 3' A county coroner was denied exemption because
the coroner was not authorized to make arrests, execute search
warrants, or carry a firearm.3 Likewise, the Director of the Security
Division of a county's public works department was also denied
exemption because, although he regularly carried a firearm and was
considered a "Peace Officer" under state law, he did not have the
authority to execute search warrants. 33
A seemingly routine exception for "clearly marked police and fire
vehicles"'134 has generated requests for guidance. Vehicles used by the
forestry employees of a state agency did not qualify because, although
the employees engaged in some fire fighting, they also spent a
substantial amount of time in other ac3ves. Clearly marked
automobiles driven by deputy sheriffs of a combined city and county
were considered exempt. 36
The regulations state that trucks and vans can be exempted if they
are modified so that it is not likely that personal use will exceed a de
minimis amount. A van with only a front bench for seating, with
permanent shelving filling most of the cargo area, and specially
vehicles were enlarged by very specific directions contained in the legislative history
of Pub. L. No. 99-44, 99 Stat. 77 (1985), a three-page statute primarily dealing with the
elimination of a "contemporaneous" recordkeeping requirement of business vehicle
mileage. See H.R. REP. No. 99-34, at 10-11 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 30,
39-41.
128 See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 2000-51-041 (Dec. 22, 2000), available at
2000 WL 33126620 (the full value of an unmarked law enforcement vehicle that
satisfies the qualified nonpersonal use vehicle standard is excluded from the
employee's gross income as a working condition fringe).
129 See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(k)(6)(ii) (2002). Requirements include
authorization by law to carry firearms, execute search warrants, and to make arrests,
and the regular carrying of firearms.
130 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-40-010 (July 5, 1988).
131 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-38-011 (June 11, 1987).
112 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-32-008 (May 4, 1987).
133 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-06-032 (Nov. 10, 1986).
134 See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(k)(2)(ii)(A), (k)(3) (2002).
135 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-48-009 (Aug. 27, 1987).
136 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-25-053 (Mar. 24, 1987).
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painted with advertising or the company's name can qualify. 137 A
taxpayer proposed that its station wagons be modified, principally by
affixing company logos to the front doors, by removing the second
seat, and by installing a steel mesh barrier between the front seats and
the rest of the interior. The Service ruled that the exception applies
only to pickup trucks or vans, and the design of a station wagon, even
as modified, is not such that it is likely to be used for personal
purposes only in a de minimis amount. The exemption was therefore
denied.'38
Generally speaking, to qualify for exemption, pickups must be
clearly marked or painted with the employer's markings and must be
equipped with industrial furnishings such as hydraulic lift gates,
permanent tanks or drums, permanent side boards or panels that raise
the level of the sides of the bed of the truck, or heavy equipment such
as an electric generator, welder, boom, or crane."' According to a
2002 private letter ruling, a state highway department's one-half ton
pickups painted white or bright orange, marked by department
insignia, and equipped with flashing lights and toolboxes did not
qualify as the modifications were "not significant when compared to
the examples listed in Rev. Rul. 86-97."' 4 Sixteen years had passed
since the enactment of DRA 1984, and the Service and taxpayers were
still plowing through these types of administrative line drawing.14
If the vehicle is not exempted from recordkeeping as a qualified
nonpersonal use vehicle, the employee will need to substantiate the
business use to support a working condition fringe exclusion, and a
lack of good taxpayer recordkeeping is reflected in reported cases.142In 1985 the Service Commissioner summarized the product of Service
117 See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(k)(7) (2002).
131 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-30-062 (Apr. 29, 1987).
139 See Rev. Rul. 86-97, 1986-2 C.B. 42, 43.
140 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-36-022 (June 3, 2002).
141 Being on the list of qualified nonpersonal use vehicles is obviously desirable.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Information Ltr. 2004-0122 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at 2004 WL
2201320 (question as to whether a "Highway Commissions and Patrol Superintendent
vehicle used for highway purposes" qualifies). The Service recommended requesting
an amendment to the regulations or a private letter ruling.
142 See supra notes 87, 112. In Zand v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1758
(1996), affd, 143 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998), a sole proprietor attempted
unsuccessfully to overcome his apparent lack of records of business use of
automobiles by claiming that the automobiles were instead fringe benefits taxable as
compensation to his employees. This was inconsistent with the taxpayer's prior
treatment of these transactions, and none of the employees who testified claimed that
any usage was to be treated as compensation to them.
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audits of automobile expenses as "big adjustments.,
43
Shifting to other forms of transportation, the personal use of
employers' aircraft has been an area of much activity. Shortly after
section 132 was enacted, the Service was asked to rule whether
employees recognized income for the value of hitching a ride on the
aircraft when it was flown to and from a locale where scheduled
maintenance was performed. The sole purpose of the flight was to
complete the maintenance. The Service ruled that the employees
could not exclude the value of the trip as a fringe benefit under
section 132,'44 nor under the section 61 valuation rules.
4
1
A 1991 nondocketed service advisory review146 addressed the
income tax consequences of a governor's travel on a helicopter owned
by the state. The facts were not well developed, but the document
follows a predictable pattern for analyses of this nature. If the
governor is involved in strictly personal travel, he or she will be
required to include the value of the transportation as income. If the
governor is involved in travel strictly for the state's business, the value
of the transportation is excluded as a working condition fringe. If the
governor is involved in travel that is of mixed nature, the primary
purpose of the travel will dictate the income tax result. The review
notes that the President of the United States is probably considered
available for work at any time, so no primarily personal trips would
ever exist. The governor was out of luck on this point - "there is no
presumption that all travel by a governor is always business in
1 See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
144 The employer was not in the business of furnishing air transportation, so the
no-additional-cost service or qualified employee discount did not apply. Because the
employees were not otherwise on business, the working condition fringe exclusion did
not apply. The ruling did not discuss why the de minimis fringe benefit rule does not
apply.
145 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-12-021 (Dec. 18, 1986). The Service narrowly
construed the valuation rules in Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2T(g)(4) (1992) (applying to trips
for personal and business purposes) and (g)(10) (ignoring the value of flights
provided to employees hitching a ride if fifty percent or more of the regular passenger
seating capacity is otherwise occupied by individuals whose flights are primarily for
business).
146 See I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review 8927 (Jan. 30, 1991), available
at 1991 WL 11239353.
147 If the governor is required to travel on the state-owned helicopter even for
strictly personal travel on account of security concerns, the includible value of the
transportation is reduced by a safe harbor formula contained in the regulations. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(m)(4) (2001).
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The valuation of personal use miles on employer-owned aircraft
can be computed using "general valuation rules" which look to what
the employee would have had to pay in an arm's length transaction to
charter the same or a comparable aircraft for the same or a
comparable flight.9 Alternatively, the value of the personal flight can
be computed with reference to a safe harbor "Standard Industry Fare
Level" formula (SIFL), multiples of which are used to calculate
estimated airfares. 1' The cents per mile SIFL formula is based on
operating cost amounts reported by the major commercial airlines."'
The use of SIFL valuation guidelines was announced in some
detail in a Senate Finance Committee report... accompanying 1985
legislation principally concerned with eliminating a requirement of
contemporaneous recordkeeping of business automobile usage. 53 The
Senate committee stated that it "believes that these substitute safe-
harbor rules reflect the intent of the Congress concerning the
valuation of personal use of noncommercial aircraft under the fringe
benefit rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1984.",114  No statutory
guidance of that nature was included in the 1985 legislation itself, and
none of the Senate's language is found in the conference agreement
148 I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review 8927, supra note 146.
,49 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(6)(ii) (1992).
150 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2T(g)(5) (1992). The employer can choose either rule
for paying employment taxes, withholding income taxes, and reporting the
employee's income, but the employer must use the same rule for all eligible flights
provided in the calendar year. The employee, however, may generally use the SIFL
valuation only if the employer uses it, but the employee can use the general valuation
rule even if the employer uses the SIFL rule. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-40-015
(Oct. 2, 1998) (demonstrating a situation where the employer will use SIFL valuation
while one employee will use the general valuation rules).
.5 The SIFL is computed by the Department of Transportation and revised semi-
annually. It was first computed as of May 1979 as part of the deregulation of the U.S.
commercial airline industry and it is still computed to evaluate commercial carrier
pricing. The SIFL is a computed cents-per-mile cost factor based on actual costs
experienced by the major commercial airlines. See U.S. Dep't of Transportation,
Office of Aviation Analysis, http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/index.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2006). The Service issues semi-annual rulings containing the updated SIFL
mileage rates and terminal charges.
15' See S. REP. No. 99-23 (1985). This report was not included in the 1985 United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News volumes, but it is accessible on
Congressional Information Service microfiche.
153 See Pub. L. No. 99-44, § 1(a), 99 Stat. 77 (1985) (repealing the
contemporaneous recordkeeping requirement that was found in I.R.C. § 274(d)).
54 S. REP. No. 99-23, at 5.
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report.'55 The SIFL tables have been criticized as too lenient in their
valuation of executive travel."' On the other hand, Assistant
Treasury Secretary Ronald A. Pearlman defended the tables as "more
certain and administrable"'57 than a facts and circumstances valuation,
and the tables would encourage reporting by taxpayers. Mr. Pearlman
defended the bargain element implicit in the calculations:
For the safe harbors to be effective, the values should not
exceed a value perceived as fair by taxpayers. If the safe
harbor values are set too high, the safe harbors will not be
used and thus will not accomplish the purpose for which they
were established, namely, reduction of the administrative
burden. 58
For example, a CEO and spouse flying 7,240 miles, round trip,
from New York City to Paris, France during the first half of 2005 on a
corporate jet with a maximum certified takeoff weight in excess of
25,001 pounds, would report $8,890.44 income under the current
regulations. 59  Assuming a simple blended federal, state, and local
marginal income tax rate of forty-five percent and no other
155 See H.R. REP. No. 99-67, at 5-13 (1985) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 44,45-52.
156 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 12,354 (1985) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). "If,
for example, an executive were to travel on vacation from Washington to Miami and
back on a corporate Lear-35 jet, current regulations would require that $8,150, the
cost of a charter for that same flight, be added to his or her taxable income." Id. at
12,355. Under the SIFL regulations, "[ilnstead of paying taxes on $8,150, he or she
would pay taxes on $1,128, about one-eighth of the $8,150 figure." Id. at 12,356. The
$8,150 amount differs from an amount for the same flight, $6,470, noted in a letter
from Senator Metzenbaum to Ronald Pearlman, Assistant Treasury Secretary, dated
May 3, 1985. See id. at 12,357; see also DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL 59-
70 (2003) (criticizing the income tax treatment of executive use of corporate aircraft).
157 See 131 CONG. REC. 12,357-58 (1985) (letter from Ronald A. Pearlman,
Assistant Treasury Secretary, to Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (May 9, 1985)).
158 Id.
159 For flights during the first half of 2005, the announced terminal charge is
$35.49, and the mileage rate for up to 500 miles is 19.42 cents per mile, 501-1500 miles
is 14.80 cents per mile, and over 1500 miles is 14.23 cents per mile. See Rev. Rul.
2005-14, 2005-12 I.R.B. 749. For a long flight such as this (3,620 miles), the
regulations require the computation through each range, not just the top range. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(g)(5) (1992). As a control employee, the multiple for a large
plane such as this is 400 percent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(g)(7) (1992). The
computation is as follows: $35.49 + (4 X ((500 X 0.1942) + (1,000 X 0.1480) + (2,120 X
0.1423))) = $2,222.61. There are two passengers, and two legs of a round trip, so the
total income recognized is $8,890.44.
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adjustments, this trip cost the CEO $4,000. That may, or may not,
offend an observer.' 60 However, the costs of operating the plane
would probably far exceed the CEO's "cost" for a transatlantic trip of
this nature, and the Service asserted that the employer's deduction
should be limited to the amount of income reported by the employee.
The Service lost several of these cases, 16 but Congress amended the
statute to provide for such limits in the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004.162
Section 132 provides for a "qualified transportation fringe" that
excludes from income the value of transportation in a commuter
highway vehicle (essentially a van), transit passes,163 and parking!
Based on recent tax expenditure estimates, the 2005 revenue losses for
these seemingly mundane benefits are among the largest of the
section 132 fringe benefits. The exclusion for reimbursed employee
160 It is difficult to document an airfare as of a certain date, but based on the
author's own inquiries, first-class round-trip airfare for this couple during August or
September 2005 on Air France would be approximately $10,000. A private charter
flight would apparently be more expensive than that.
161 See Midland Fin. Co. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 371 (2001); Nat'l
Bancorp of Alaska, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 369 (2001); Sutherland
Lumber-Sw., Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 197 (2000), affd, 255 F.3d 495 (8th Cir.
2001), acq., 2002-1 C.B. XVII.
162 Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 907(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1654-55 (2004) (amending I.R.C.
§ 274(e)(2)); see I.R.S. Notice 2005-45, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1228 (providing interim
guidance on application of the amended statute).
163 See I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(B); see, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-48-017 (Dec. 6,
1995) (addressing the federal employment tax consequences of a two voucher
program in which all employees received a nontaxable Voucher A redeemable only
for transit passes, while employees using alternative commute modes (carpooling,
bicycling, walking, or telecommuting) also received a taxable Voucher B redeemable
by selected vendors that "sell equipment, services, or materials that support
alternative commute modes").
164 See I.R.C. § 132(f). Several private letter rulings deal with qualified parking
benefits. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-47-003 (Nov. 21, 2003) (approving a
salary reduction arrangement providing for a $150 monthly charge for employee
parking in a lot adjacent to office space leased by the employer); see also I.R.S. Chief
Couns. Advisory 2001-05-007 (Feb. 2, 2001), available at 2001 WL 89575
(reimbursements for parking costs incurred at nontemporary work locations away
from the employer's place of business should qualify as an excludable parking
benefit). These fringe benefits can offer some traps for the employee. An employee
apparently elected a monthly salary reduction amount for transportation expenses
which exceeded the monthly transportation expenditures. Citing Treas. Reg. § 1.132-
9(b), Q&A 14(a), the Service explained that the employee could not claim a refund
for the unused balance upon termination of employment. See I.R.S. Information Ltr.
2003-0244 (Dec. 31, 2003), available at 2003 WL 23194377.
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parking expenses produces an estimated $2.59 billion revenue loss,
and the exclusion for employer-provided transit passes produces an
estimated revenue loss of $480 million. 165Most people commute to
work in some fashion, and these revenue losses demonstrate how
relatively small amounts can mount up when the affected taxpayers
comprise a large group.
Finally, section 132 permits auto salesmen to use dealership-
owned vehicles (so-called "demonstrators") on a tax-free basis. The
exclusion requires that "such use is provided primarily to facilitate the
salesman's performance of services for the employer. ' 166  Although
one can certainly spin support for this treatment, such as encouraging
a salesperson to learn about the cars to be sold, one suspects that
compensatory motives are at play as well. 16 Nevertheless, if a dealer
follows the rules, which are not without their pitfalls,6 sales people
can use new cars for personal roundtrip commuting from their
residence to the dealership, plus an average additional ten miles per
165 See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
166 I.R.C. § 132(j)(3)(B)(i).
167 Although anecdotal, an advertisement in a Denver, Colorado newspaper for
car salespersons included in a list of perks "likes a 401k with profit sharing" along
with "likes having a company demo." DENVER POST, June 9, 2005, at 12G. A 1994
Field Service Advisory noted that an employer's offer of cash in lieu of demonstrator
automobile use "seems to be evidence that the dealer is providing the automobile as
compensation rather than 'primarily to facilitate the performance of services."' I.R.S.
Field Serv. Advisory (Oct. 24, 1994), available at 1994 WL 1725360.
168 In 2001, the Service issued a comprehensive revenue procedure in question
and answer format that provides guidance for compliance with the statute. See Rev.
Proc. 2001-56, 2001-2 C.B. 590. For a fourteen-page example of a taxpayer's
halfhearted attempts at compliance with the automobile demonstrator regulations,
coupled with the sheer volume of technical requirements, see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.
98-01-002 (Jan. 5, 1998). See also I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (1997), available at 1997
WL 33107176 (additional informal guidance concerning demonstrator automobiles);
I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Oct. 24, 1994), available at 1994 WL 1725360. If the
income tax exclusion does not apply, the employee must report income for the use of
the automobile derived from a hypothetical lease value tied to the fair market value
of the automobile. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(d) (1992). The valuation method
prescribed by the Treasury Regulations can understate the value of the automobile
usage. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 2d 445 (D.N.J.
1998), the taxpayer used an incorrect fair market value of the automobiles in applying
the valuation tables, with the upshot that the court permitted the Service to use a
method of valuation outside of the tables, the result of which "was to increase annual
fringe benefit values of the assigned vehicles by about 50% over the values that the
IRS would have derived if it applied the Table using the IRS's own fair market value
numbers." Id. at 448; see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-16-007 (Apr. 17, 1998)
(addressing the same issue as in BMW of North America, Inc.).
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day, without recognizing any taxable income. Commuting for most
taxpayers is a nondeductible personal expense. For auto
salespeople, the value of the use of the car is deductible as a practical
matter, because the receipt of the benefit is tax-free. It is one of the
customary perks of the profession fossilized by DRA 1984.
C. Relatively Few Employee Discount and No-Additional-Cost Fringe
Questions
Based on the body of private letter rulings and other materials,
there is relatively little activity concerning employee discounts and no-
additional-cost fringes. However, what activity there is tends to
involve larger taxpayers such as integrated oil companies, national
retailers, airlines, and automobile producers.
On several occasions, taxpayers requested rulings on the issue of
whether affiliated companies constitute a single line of business for
purposes of qualified employee discounts.' The regulations treat
seemingly disparate lines of business as one "[i]f it is uncommon in the
industry of the employer for any of the separate lines of business of
the employer to be operated without the others.', 172  The
manufacturing and sale of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories were
deemed to be part of the same line of business as the financing of sales
and leases of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories.'73 A 1988 private
letter ruling 1 4 approved the aggregation of seven otherwise unrelated
169 See Rev. Proc. 2001-56, Q&A 12.
170 See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (1972) ("The taxpayer's costs of commuting to
his place of business or employment are personal expenses and do not qualify as
deductible expenses.").
171 See I.R.C. § 132(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(c) (1992).
172 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-4(a)(3)(i) (1989).
173 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-25-068 (Mar. 27,1990).
174 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-26-061 (Apr. 6, 1988). The Service approved the
aggregation of: (1) oil and gas exploration and production, (2) petroleum refining,
wholesaling, and retailing, (3) overwater shipping, (4) oil and gas pipeline
transportation, (5) natural gas pipelines services, (6) oil and gas research and
engineering, and (7) manufacture and sale of petrochemicals. The Service had
already approved the aggregation of the first six activities in a 1986 private letter
ruling. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-08-048 (Nov. 26, 1986). The 1988 ruling sought
aggregation of the seventh petrochemical function with the other six functions. What
is at stake here, particularly with the industrial product character of many of the
businesses? From the ruling, the focus was apparently on employee discounts at the
retail petroleum stores, described in the ruling as a ten percent employee discount on
purchases of gasoline, motor oil, grease, specialties, and other petroleum products,
and a fifteen percent employee discount on tires, batteries, and accessories.
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activities of an integrated oil and gas company.
Another rule permits aggregation if the retail operations of an
employer that are located on the same premises but in separate lines
of business would be considered to be in one line of business if the
merchandise were offered for sale in a department store. The
regulations offer an example of an employer selling both women's
apparel and jewelry on the same premises. If sold together at a
department store, the operations would be part of the same line of
business, and are therefore treated as one line of business under the• • 176
regulations. In a 1993 private letter ruling, the Service ruled that an
employer could not use this rule to aggregate its retail clothing sales
line of business with its optical goods and accessories line of
business.'77
An employee of a "qualified affiliate" can receive excludable no-
additional-cost services on an airline that is part of the same affiliated
group.7 7 A "qualified affiliate" is a corporation predominantly
engaged in "airline-related services. '' 179  "Airline-related services"
include services provided in connection with air transportation such as
catering, baggage handling, ticketing and reservations, flight planning
and weather analysis, restaurants, and gift shops located at an
airport.' 80 A 1986 private letter ruling applied this rule to an employee
175 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-4(a)(3)(iii) (1989).
176 Id.
177 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-28-016 (July 16, 1993). Two-thirds of the optical
goods and accessories retail stores were located in the same malls where the retail
clothing outlets were located. The employer argued that having access to the same
common areas of the mall satisfied the same premises requirement. The Service
rejected that, but it is unclear whether the two-thirds was insufficient or whether the
common area argument was the weakness. In addition, the Service concluded that
the retail clothing operations and the optical goods and accessories operations would
not be one line of business if offered for sale in a department store. In a 1989 private
letter ruling, another taxpayer subsequently withdrew its request for a ruling that its
general merchandise stores for low- to moderately-priced merchandise be aggregated
with the businesses of three subsidiaries that operated specialty stores devoted to
footwear, adult clothing, and children's and infants' clothing, respectively. See I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-36-041 (Sept. 8, 1989). It is difficult to find any basis in the
regulations for the withdrawn request.
178 Employees of unrelated airlines can enjoy tax-free airfare on the respective
airlines if reciprocal agreements between the airlines are in place. See I.R.C. § 132(i).
The issue addressed by the accompanying discussion is to what degree employees of
affiliated services, such as gift shops, are considered part of the airline for purposes of
enjoying tax-free airfare under reciprocal arrangements with other airlines.
179 See I.R.C. § 132(j)(5)(B).
180 See I.R.C. § 132(j)(5)(C).
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of a corporation that provided in-flight food and beverage services for
the airline and managed airport restaurants, concessions, and gift
shops.' Two private letter rulings issued on the following day
address identical facts. 82  The three rulings are somewhat notable
because they are apparently issued to the employee, not to the
employer.8 3 In a 1987 technical advice memorandum '84 the Service
concluded that the employees of a freight transportation company
could not exclude personal flights in freight aircraft jump seats as a
no-additional-cost service. The employer used both aircraft and
motor vehicles to transport freight, but it did not offer passenger
flights to the public, and the Service concluded that the employer
must offer the service for sale to customers for the exclusion to
apply. This distinction was eliminated, in favor of taxpayers, by an
amendment included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.186
The facts of two technical advice memoranda are discussed next.
Technical advice memoranda are usually the product of a taxpayer
audit. So, in that respect, these are exceptional cases, having been
singled out for Service enforcement. The facts of the first technical
advice memorandum describe a situation where the taxpayer simply
did not apply the rules. It could call into question how many other
taxpayers are equally unaware or dismissive of the rules of section
132. The second technical advice memorandum deals with a large,
sophisticated taxpayer caught up in fine distinctions, ones that it
181 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-37-129 (June 19, 1986).
1 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-38-030 (June 20, 1986); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-38-
033 (June 20, 1986).
183 Private letter rulings can be relied upon only by the specific addressee. See
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3). Employees (and employers) in identical or similar circumstances,
however, can draw some comfort from a favorable ruling. It is the exceptional case in
which a private letter ruling is directed to the employee rather than the employer.
That is predictable in most cases, given the professional fees that most taxpayers
would be required to pay for such guidance. It is speculation as to whether an
employee group, union, employer, etc. provided aid to the employees to establish a
precedent.
184 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 87-41-007 (June 5, 1987).
185 The technical advice memorandum does not discuss the applicability of a de
minimis fringe benefit. Also, the taxable value of the flight might be minimized by
the regulations found at Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2T(g) (1992), and considered zero if at
least fifty percent of the regular passenger seating (apparently confined to the jump
seats) were occupied by individuals flying for the employer's business. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-2T(g)(10) (1992). In a 1997 private letter ruling, the Service limited the
application of these beneficial valuation rules in a similar situation. See supra notes
144-45 and accompanying text.
186 See infra note 362.
1010 [Vol. 25:977
Internal Revenue Code Section 132
apparently thought it had resolved when it participated in shaping the
contours of the DRA 1984 provisions. 
18
The first technical advice memorandum,""' issued in 1997,
demonstrates how unextraordinary fringe benefits can nevertheless
produce includable income. In the memorandum, the "Director of
Golf" and the "Director of Tennis" were both part of an extensive
private club, 189 and each enjoyed the free use of the facilities for
themselves and their families. The Service concluded that these
privileges were taxable fringe benefits. First, the exclusion for an on-
premises athletic facility did not apply because access to the facility
was made available to the general public through the sale of
memberships.' 9° Second, in light of the fees that would otherwise
apply to such use (club initiation fees, monthly dues, and greens and
tennis court fees), the Service asserted that the de minimis fringe
benefit rule did not apply either. Finally, the no-additional-cost
services exemption apparently failed because the benefit was not
broadly available to other employees, such that the nondiscrimination
requirement was not satisfied.' 9'
The second technical advice memorandum deals with employee
product testing. Employee product testing outside the employer's
workplace can be excluded as a working condition fringe. This is not
expressed in the statute, but was discussed in the legislative history in
some detail.' 9' The regulations provide guidelines for employee
product testing that qualifies for the exclusion.'93 The opportunities
for abuse are obvious, but so are the desirable business benefits of
having interested employees thoroughly test the products, albeit
through long-term personal use.
The pivotal requirements include limits placed on the employee's
selection of the product, the employee's submission of detailed
reports of the testing, and the products not being supplied in a
discriminatory manner unless supported by a business reason. In the
187 See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
188 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-17-001 (Apr. 3, 1996).
189 "The taxpayer owns and operates two 18-hole golf courses, a golf pro shop,
indoor and outdoor tennis facilities, a tennis pro shop, an athletic facility, a yacht club,
and a clubhouse containing restaurant and bar facilities, meeting rooms, a ballroom,
and locker rooms." Id.
190 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e)(1) (1992).
191 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8(f)(1) (1989).
192 See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1602-03 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
697,1226-27.




1994 technical advice memorandum the Service concluded that the
program did not satisfy the requirements for the exclusion. Only
approximately seven percent of the employees eligible to participate
in the program were nonhighly-compensated employees, which raised
the issue of whether the purpose of the program was primarily
compensatory. The Service noted that "[t]he Company does not
dispute that Program participants consider the program to be a
valuable fringe benefit. Eligible employees rarely decline
participation in [the] Program."' 95
The Service found that the employer did not impose a strict
prohibition on the use of the product by members of the employee's
family. It also found that evaluation forms were too cursory,
consisting of a one-page checksheet to be completed within five days
following receipt of the product, and a second one-page checksheet to
be completed immediately prior to removal of the product from the
Program.
As is often the case, the remainder of the technical advice
memorandum addressed the issue of greatest importance to the
employer - whether the employer had reasonable belief that it was
not required to withhold employment taxes on the value of the fringe
benefits. The employer in part argued that its reasonable belief was
demonstrated by its participation in the legislative process for DRA
1984, where "its program was the model on which the legislation and
the [product testing] regulations were based.' 96 The Service rejected
this argument because of factual inaccuracies as to employee• • 197
participation and because it saw the inquiry as "whether the
Company had a reasonable belief based on the legislative history that
was available to all taxpayers when section 132 of the Code was
enacted.'
98
194 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-01-002 (Jan. 12, 1994).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 The employer apparently represented to Congressional staff that forty to
forty-five percent of the program participants were lower-level salaried employees.
198 Id. Based on a 1995 Field Service Advisory that seems to be consistent with
this case, the employer offered to agree to liability for the employment tax liability in
return for a commitment from the Service that it would drop audits of the individual
employees' income tax returns, who apparently were highly-compensated individuals.
See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Nov. 21, 1995), available at 1995 WL 1918543. A
nondocketed service advice review issued a month earlier apparently applies to a
product testing program of this or another automobile manufacturer. The facts are
similar, but contain some differences that suggest another taxpayer. One notable
difference is that the plan permitted use by retirees, who might not be considered
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D. Working Condition Fringes are Pivotal
The so-called "working condition fringe" is excluded from income
to the extent a deduction under sections 162 or 167 would be
allowable if the employee paid for the property or services provided
by the employer. 99 Essentially, the Code ignores payments received
by an employee that would produce an overall "wash" for income tax
purposes because the employee could claim a correlative deduction.
This overlaps to a degree with the "accountable plan" rules under
which "[a]mounts treated as paid under an accountable plan are
excluded from the employee's gross income, are not reported as wages
or other compensation on the employee's Form W-2, and are exempt
from the withholding and payment of employment taxes.,
20
0
However, the accountable plan rules generally apply to employee
travel expenses, while the working condition fringe benefit exclusion
can include any business expense allowable under sections 162 or
167. 20 1 The working condition fringe benefit regulations nevertheless,
like the accountable plan rules, impose employee substantiation
202
requirements, particularly for cash payments.
"employees" for purposes of the exclusion. See I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Advice
Review 5034 (Oct. 18, 1995), available at 1995 WL 1922017.
199 See I.R.C. § 132(d). The statute identifies only sections 162 and 167.
Accordingly, the regulations would not treat an employer-paid, mandatory physical
examination program as a working condition fringe, because the employee's potential
offsetting deduction would rest under I.R.C. § 213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-
5(a)(1)(iv). But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-40-051 (Oct. 5, 1990) (ruling that the
employer's payment of the physician costs for a mandatory driver fitness screening
program can be excluded as a medical benefit under I.R.C. § 105(b)).
200 Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(c)(4) (2000). Prior to 1958, employees were required to
report the reimbursement as income and claim a corresponding business expense
deduction. See Biehl v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 467, 476 n.9 (2002), affd, 351 F.3d
982 (9th Cir. 2003).
201 See, e.g., Namyst v. Comm'r, 435 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming a decision
of the Tax Court that an employer's cash reimbursements for tools were not payments
under an accountable plan); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-15-019 (Apr. 14, 1995) (treating
insurance company's reimbursements to employee sales agents of advertising,
automobile mileage, business insurance, professional dues, postage and photocopying
expenses, legal and professional services, office supplies, rent/lease, computer
terminal and/or printer rental, staffing, and utilities as working condition fringe
benefits and not as an accountable plan); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-22-044 (May 29,
1998) (treating another insurer's similar reimbursement plan more precisely, as an
accountable plan with respect to business mileage reimbursements, and as a working
condition fringe benefit with respect to the other reimbursed amounts).
202 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v) (2001) (employee must verify that the
payment is actually used for such expenses and return to the employer any unused
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The regulations maintain that the trade or business deduction that
would be allowable to the employee is confined to the trade or
business of the employee as an employee of the employer, and an
unrelated business does not qualify.2°3 This linkage of the employee's
deduction to the business of the employer reflects the "working
condition" relationship.20 The Service applied this rule in a 1989
private letter ruling denying working condition fringe benefit
treatment to an employee's receipt of employer-financed
205outplacement services. Outplacement services apply to the
employee's next job with another employer, not to the trade or
business of the employee as an employee of the employer offering the
assistance. In a 1992 revenue ruling the Service reversed its position
and held that job placement assistance could qualify as a working
condition fringe, based on the rationale that the current employer
206derives a substantial business benefit from extending such benefits.
part of the payment). The Service typically insists on submission of receipts by
employees substantiating the expenditures. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-025
(Oct. 28, 1994) (disapproving a cash employee uniform maintenance allowance where
proof of use would be an employee's statement every sixty days certifying that he or
she spent an amount equal to or in excess of the uniform allowance or, alternatively,
execution of a statement that specifies the amount the guard spent for uniform
cleaning and maintenance coupled with a requirement of return of any unspent
amount or treatment as taxable wages), with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-041 (Mar. 1,
1991) (approving a fixed yearly allowance for uniforms and fixed allowance for dog
food for police dogs who lived with officer handlers held to be a working condition
fringe upon employer's representations of intention as complying with the
substantiation requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v)).
203 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(2)(i) (2001).
204 Under pre-DRA 1984 doctrine, the factory roof above the workman's head
was considered a nontaxable working condition. See supra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text. Under DRA 1984 the workman, as a technical matter, "claims" a
hypothetical business deduction for the factory roof, producing the same result. This
comparison to the underlying structure of pre-DRA 1984 doctrine would be eroded if
the workman would receive a benefit from the employer, but claim an offsetting
hypothetical deduction with respect to a trade or business unrelated to that of the
employer who provided the benefit.
205 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-13-008 (Mar. 31, 1989). The employee could claim
an offsetting itemized deduction for the placement service. However, to benefit, the
employee's amount of placement costs plus other miscellaneous itemized deductions
would need to exceed a two percent of adjusted gross income floor, see I.R.C. § 67,
and his or her total itemized deductions would need to exceed the standard
deduction, see I.R.C. § 63(c). The 1989 private letter ruling was withdrawn in I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-40-025 (Oct. 5, 1990).
206 See Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51.
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E. The De Minimis Fringe Has Not Generated Significant Activity
Outside of Meal Money - Receipt of Cash is Almost Always Taxable
Income
DRA 1984 created a statutory recognition of the administrative
practice that had ignored fringe benefits small-in-amount or provided• o I 207
infrequently. The de minimis fringe benefit exclusion is not subject
208to nondiscrimination rules, so one might expect abuses in terms of
highly-compensated employees, but there is no direct evidence of that.
The statute does not mention meal money, or any other specific
benefit (other than eating facilities), but the legislative history of the
House bill provided examples of benefits which are generally
excluded as de minimis fringe benefits:
[T]he typing of a personal letter by a company secretary,
occasional personal use of the company copying machine,
monthly transit passes provided at a discount not exceeding
$15, occasional company cocktail parties or picnics for
employees, occasional supper money or taxi fare for
employees because of overtime work, and certain holiday
209gifts of property with a low fair market value.
The regulations generally adopted these examples, but with some
embellishments.210
Two reported disputes involved less grand amounts, at least taken
on an individual employee basis. A 2004 technical advice
[The employer] derives a substantial business benefit from the
outplacement services that is distinct from the benefit that it would derive
from the payment of additional compensation, because the services help
promote a positive corporate image, maintain employee morale, and
decrease the likelihood of wrongful termination suits in connection with the
reduction in force.
Id. at 53.
207 See I.R.C. § 132(e).
208 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(f) (1992).
209 H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1168 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1856.
210 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (1992). The regulations, for example, state
that personal use of a photocopying machine is a de minimis fringe "provided that the
employer exercises sufficient control and imposes significant restrictions on the
personal use of the machine so that at least 85 percent of the use of the machine is for
business purposes." Id. This limitation was added in the conference agreement. See
H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1171-72, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1859-60.
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memorandum concluded that a $35 gift certificate redeemable at
several grocery stores could not be excluded as a de minimis fringe
benefit. A 1998 Claims Court decision had previously treated
212restaurant vouchers with a face value of $50 as taxable wages. The
Service fringe benefits instructions booklet reflects this position:
"Cash, no matter how little, is never excludable as a de minimis
benefit, except for occasional meal money or transportation fare.
21 1
The Service has applied the de minimis fringe benefit rule to
exclude the value of employer-provided group-term life insurance
payable on the death of a spouse or dependent of an employee if the
face amount does not exceed $2,000.2 14 The Service has suggested that
awards of tangible property with a fair market value not in excess of
$35 to employees on account of contributions to a "Quality
215Improvement Process" would qualify as a de minimis fringe benefit.
The Service's position overrides section 74 that specifically addresses
216employee awards.
2 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2004-37-030 (Sept. 10, 2004).
212 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 712, 725 (1998), affid in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
213 EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE, supra note 73, at 6.
214 See I.R.S. Notice 89-110, 1989-2 C.B. 447; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2005-02-040
(Jan. 14, 2005) (in part referring to this de minimis rule); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-
33-011 (Aug. 18, 2000) (in part referring to this de minimis rule).
215 See I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review 8757 (Sep. 17, 1991), available
at 1991 WL 11239281. The Service noted that when awards exceed $50 in value
additional scrutiny would be required, and awards with a fair market value of $100 or
more would not be considered de minimis.
216 I.R.C. § 74(a) includes in income "amounts received as prizes and awards."
I.R.C. § 74(c) provides an exclusion from income for certain "employee achievement
award[s]." An "employee achievement award" is limited to items of tangible personal
property transferred for length of service achievement or safety achievement, and the
value of an excludable award cannot exceed $1,600. See I.R.C. § 274(j)(3)(A). The
employees in the nondocketed service advice review were being recognized for
contributions to quality improvement, which would not qualify. The Service relied on
language from the "Blue Book" for the Tax Reform Act of 1986, in connection with
the discussion of section 74, to the effect that "Congress wished to clarify that the
section 132(e) exclusion for de minimis fringe benefits can apply to employee awards
of low value." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 33 (Joint Comm. Print 1987).
However, the Blue Book expands the "low value" concept, stating that:
Congress also concluded that this exclusion should be viewed as applicable
to traditional awards (such as a gold watch) upon retirement after lengthy
service for an employer. For example, in the case of an employee who has
worked for an employer for 25 years, a retirement gift of a gold watch may
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In a 1991 nondocketed service advice review,2 7 the Service argued
218that free tickets or season passes given to city council members were
probably not excluded as a de minimis fringe benefit. Season tickets
are expressly excluded from qualifying as a de minimis fringe benefitS 219
by the regulations. The Service also expressed some skepticism as to
whether the council members could establish that attendance at the
events qualified as ordinary and necessary business expenses, thereby
permitting working condition fringe treatment.
An employer sought guidance as to the treatment of several types
of income tax preparation fringe benefits in a 1994 private letter. 220
ruling. The Service ruled that the value of income tax preparation
services provided to employees by company employees at a Volunteer
Income Tax Assistance (VITA) site sponsored by the employer
qualified as a de minimis fringe benefit. Likewise, the value of
compensation paid by the employer to an electronic filing
intermediary for formatting and transmitting completed employee
income tax returns (or if such services were provided by the employer
itself) qualified as a de minimis fringe benefit. However, the value of
nontransferable coupons entitling the identified holder to a single
session at an income tax preparation clinic including the transmission
of the completed return, distributed by the employer to employees
221who did not work within 100 miles of the employer's headquarters
was not excludable as a de minimis fringe benefit and was presumably
a gross income item.
qualify for exclusion as a de minimis fringe benefit even though gold
watches given throughout the period of employment would not so qualify
for exclusion. In that case, the award is not made in recognition of any
particular achievement, relates to many years of employment, and does not
reflect any expectation of or incentive for the recipient's rendering of future
services.
Id; see Mark W. Cochran, Cadillacs, Gold Watches, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986:
The Continuing Evolution of the Tax Treatment of Gifts to Employees, 5 AKRON TAX
J. 27, 62 (1988) (criticizing this position).
217 See Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review 8743 (July 30, 1991), available at 1991
WL 11239273.
218 Judging by contemporaneous press reports, this apparently involved the
Denver Colorado City Council. See Fawn Germer, Freebies Give Council Both Fun
and Trouble, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 24, 1989, at 7, available at 1989 WLNR
339252; Fawn Germer, IRS Looking Into Denver City Council Freebies, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, July 17, 1991, at 6, available at 1991 WLNR 466885.
219 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(d) (1992).
220 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-42-003 (July 11, 2004).
21 Coupons were also distributed to employees who worked within 100 miles of
the headquarters but work constraints precluded them from using the VITA site.
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Congress included certain employee eating facilities under the de
minimis fringe benefit category, and that exemption did generate
significant litigation and Congressional tinkering discussed in the next
section. Otherwise, administrative releases and judicial activity do not
suggest a lot of nonqualifying activity, which is surprising considering
the flexibility of the standard and, unlike rules for demonstrator
automobiles or free airfare, its potential applicability to almost any
employer. One might speculate that this is a function of the small
amounts that can be in question, until the Service is faced with a
widespread, routine compensation practice that attracts enforcement
attention. That was apparently at issue with respect to the utility
12company meal allowances, also discussed in the next section.
F. The De Minimis Fringe Benefit and Meals
In response to the cryptic reference to "occasional supper money"
223in the legislative history of DRA 1984, the regulations mightily
attempt to extinguish any smoldering embers of O.D. 214224 by
imposing several conditions. Meal money "provided to an employee
on a regular or routine basis is not provided on an occasional basis.
2 15
Meal money must be provided because overtime work "necessitates
an extension of the employee's normal work schedule. ' '226 Finally, the
meal or meal money must be "provided to enable the employee to
work overtime., 227 That requirement is followed by an example of
meals provided on the employer's premises during the overtime
period.
A question unanswered by the regulations is whether an
allowance that could be used to purchase a meal after the overtime
period is excludable. The author of a 2002 field service advisory
strictly interpreted this requirement:
This exception does not permit the Company's employees to
exclude cash payments for overtime meals from income
unless the money is attributable to meals consumed during
the overtime period. Under the facts, the "employees are not
obligated to purchase meals, but are free to use the cash for
222 See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
225 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(d)(2)(i)(A) (1992).
226 Id. § 1.132-6(d)(2)(i)(B).
221 Id. § 1.132-6(d)(2)(i)(C).
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any other purpose." This suggests that the Company's cash
payments do not enable ... its employees to work overtime.228
This Service position would dramatically curtail tax-free meal
allowances.
The "occasional" aspect of the regulations is an uncertain
229concept. In a 1991 technical advice memorandum the Service
addressed a utility company's meal allowance policy that was dictated
by its collective bargaining agreement. The employees were eligible
for a meal reimbursement or a cash meal allowance for every four-
hour interval of emergency work on a nonwork day or outside regular
work hours on a work day. In addition, the employees received a
meal reimbursement or a cash meal allowance for working more than
one hour beyond regular work hours and for emergency work
performed on work days starting two or more hours before regular
work hours. The linkage of the meal allowances to deviations from
the regular work-day period apparently satisfied the requirement of
an extension of the normal work schedule. Consequently, the focus
was on the "occasional" quality of the payments. The regulations for
the year in issue, 1985, permitted frequency to be judged in the
aggregate, rather than on an employee-by-employee basis, if it would
be administratively difficult to determine frequency with respect to
individual employees.23° The employer paid the allowances from petty
cash and did not maintain individual employee records of payments.
The Service rejected this claim of the aggregate method, asserting that
it would permit employers to create the exception through poor
231recordkeeping.
The employer then demonstrated that the amount of meal
allowances divided by the entire workforce would generate a monthly
average meal allowance of $10 and, if averaged only with union
employees, would generate a monthly average meal allowance of
228 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (2002), available at 2002 WL 1315665 (original
paragraph structure removed).
229 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-48-001 (Nov. 29, 1991).
230 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6T(b) (1989). The final regulations applicable to post-
1988 years permit aggregate calculations, but not with respect to meal money. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b) (1992).
231 To require an employer to maintain good records to qualify for an exception
whose guiding principle is the avoidance of accounting which is unreasonable or
administratively impracticable seems inappropriate if such records would not
otherwise be required by good business practice.
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$14. The employer argued that both of these amounts were small
and demonstrated that benefits were provided only occasionally, but
the Service rejected this interpretation based on averages. The
Service also rejected a de minimis test of comparing the amount of
meal allowances to the employer's total payroll .2' The employer also
argued that the meal allowances were paid on an "irregular" basis and
were therefore occasional. The Service responded that overtime work
and emergencies were a routine part of the business, and the company
had an established practice of providing meals allowances in these
events. Indeed, it was incorporated in the union agreements. Of
course, it seems one would expect that a presumably large business
organization would need established policies for something like this,
and would not leave it to ad hoc practices. In reading this technical
advice memorandum, one arrives at an overall conclusion that there is
something to the Service's argument that the routine nature of these
allowances is more than occasional - a routine and expected salary
supplement is masquerading as a tax-free, occasional item. The
regulation and the Service's arguments do little, however, to produce
234a firm analytical support for that largely intuitive conclusion.
232 According to the Service, the average was probably misleading because some
of the employment categories were much more likely to earn the meal allowances.
233 The House version of DRA 1984 provided that property or services would be
de minimis if their value was so small, considered in the aggregate, as to make
accounting for the benefits unreasonable or administratively impracticable. The
Conference Agreement stated:
In lieu of the aggregation rule in the House bill, the conference agreement
provides that the frequency with which similar fringe benefits (otherwise
excludable as de minimis fringes) are provided by the employer to its
employees is to be taken into account, among other relevant factors, in
determining whether the fair market value of the property or service is so
small that accounting for the property or service would be unreasonable or
administratively impracticable.
H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1171-72 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1445, 1859-60.
234 A 1994 Service memorandum on meal allowances addressed a similar
situation where employees (usually production plant workers and
maintenance/tradespersons) were entitled to meal allowances every time the
employees worked a specified amount of overtime or performed services on a
nonwork day or outside normal hours. The memorandum reached no conclusions
beyond the general prescription: "Whether a benefit is provided occasionally must be
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the availability,
regularity and routine with which the benefit is provided." Internal Revenue Serv.,
Industry Specialization Program Coordinated Issue, All Industries, Meal Allowances
(Apr. 15, 1994), available at 1994 WL 150087.
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The Service resisted finding a de minimis fringe with reference to
overall averages, which otherwise could influence someone weary of
the fine lines in this area, to "just not bother" with trifling amounts.
In the absence of nondiscrimination rules, however, the use of overall
averages as a guide would invite abuses. The regulations are clear
that averages are potentially misleading:
For example, if an employer provides a free meal in kind to
one employee on a daily basis, but not to any other employee,
the value of the meals is not de minimis with respect to that
one employee even though with respect to the employer's
entire workforce the meals are provided "infrequently.,
235
A de minimis fringe benefit includes the employer's operation of
an employee eating facility, and the principal qualification is that the
revenue from the facility normally equals or exceeds the direct
operating costs. 236 Because only direct operating costs are considered,
231
the facility usually will be subsidized by the employer.
A 1996 field service advisory238 addressed the seemingly unusual
issue of whether an employer could aggregate vending machine banks
with hot meal cafeterias in an attempt to make the latter qualify as a
de minimis fringe benefit. The higher profit margin vending machine
income would have helped the hot meal cafeterias meet the
requirement that revenue normally equals or exceeds the direct
operating costs of the facility. This issue is raised in the regulations,
which permit the employer to include "vending machines that are
provided by the employer and located on the same premises as the
other eating facilities operated by the employer, 23 9 in determining the
direct operating costs of a facility. Still, the Service concluded that it
is not the intent of the regulations to treat "eating areas consisting
solely of vending machines, seating, related equipment, utensils and
235 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (1992).
216 See I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(B).
237 Direct operating costs do not include the costs of a manager whose services
are not performed primarily on the premises of the eating facility, nor apparently the
cost of rent, utilities, and other facilities costs. Under pre-DRA 1984 law, the Service
maintained that an employee would recognize income for the bargain element of
employer cafeteria meals if the employee was not required to pay for the meals
whether or not he or she accepted or declined the meals such that section 119 applied.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 77-40-010 (June 30, 1977).
211 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Nov. 18, 1996), available at 1996 WL
33321195.
2" Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(b)(1)(ii) (1989).
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condiments ... [as] 'eating facilities."'
24
0
The exclusion for employer-provided meals and lodging
(excluding the military) represents one of the more significant taxreveue osss, $50 ... 241
revenue losses, $850 million. The most significant litigation in the
meals area, however, involved the employer's income tax deduction
242for the expense of employee dining rooms at casinos. Although
section 119 was at the center of the litigation, section 132 played an
important supporting role. During the applicable time period, section
274 generally limited a deduction for meal expenses to eighty percent
of the costs, 243 but all of the costs were allowed if the meals qualified
as a de minimis fringe benefit under the section 132 employee eating
244facility exemption. In computing the revenues and direct operating
costs of such a facility, employees entitled to exclude the value of a
meal under section 119 are treated as having paid an amount for the
meal equal to the direct operating costs of the facility attributable to
the meal. This requirement focused the litigation on the degree to
which the taxpayers' employees qualified for the section 119
exclusion.
The taxpayer, Boyd Gaming Corp., lost in the Tax Court on the
section 119 issue, but Congress quickly responded by amending
section 119 in the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998 24 to include a rule that all employees would
qualify under section 119 if more than half of the employees otherwise1.- /246 • 247
qualified. This amendment was effective retroactively, but the
240 I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Nov. 18, 1996), available at 1996 WL 33321195.
241 See infra note 374 and accompanying text. This amount apparently speaks to
section 119, not to the section 132 de minimis fringe.
242 See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 759 (1997), rev'd,
177 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999), acq., 1999-2 C.B. XVI. In an earlier decision involving
this and another taxpayer, the Tax Court decided cross-motions for partial summary
judgment that refined the doctrinal basis of the later case. See Boyd Gaming Corp. v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. 343 (1996).
243 The eighty percent limitation was added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 142(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2118 (1986). The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 decreased this amount to fifty percent for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1993. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,209(a), 107
Stat. 312, 469 (1993).
244 See I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B).
245 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C.).
246 Id. § 5002(a) (adding new I.R.C. § 119(b)(4)).
241 Id. § 5002(b) (the amendment applies to tax years beginning before, on, or
after July 22, 1998).
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Service's concessions on appeal still placed the percentages of
employees covered by section 119 at forty-one to forty-eight percent,
short of the required greater than fifty percent.24 All of this proved to
be largely irrelevant, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the Tax Court on the fundamental convenience of the employer
factor, ruling that the taxpayer's "stay-on-premises" policy for
249employees made most of the workforce eligible for section 119
210treatment of the employer-provided meals.
G. Slim Athletic Facility Activity
The exclusion for on-premises athletic facilities 21 has generated
little administrative activity. In a 1990 private letter ruling, the
Service ruled that an athletic facility operated by a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the employer and offering services to the employer's
employees plus employees of other tenants of the employer's
252headquarters building qualified for exclusion. The apparent
concern was the impact of the use by the employees of the unrelated
tenants, but the Service found that the other employers were
considered to be joint owners of the facility. Although private letter
254
rulings have no precedential value, another taxpayer attempted to
use this private letter ruling to bolster its argument that continuing to
offer memberships to the general public, albeit in a dwindling
percentage as compared to the employee users, did not violate the
248 See Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner, 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999).
249 "[F]or reasons of security and logistics, [the taxpayers] require their
employees to stay on the business premises throughout the work shift." Id. at 1097.
250 This issue was probably of interest to many casino operators. A 1998
technical advice memorandum, apparently dealing with another casino (because of
footnote nine referring to the Boyd Gaming Corp. litigation) involves an in-depth
analysis of the section 119 issue in the context of required employment taxes. The
Service concluded that the exclusion did not apply despite the casino's stay-on-
premises rule as well as other claims of substantial noncompensatory business
reasons. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-41-001 (Oct. 9, 1998); see also I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 98-41-002 (Oct. 9, 1998) (another casino meals case, and not Boyd
Gaming Corp. due to footnote eleven); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-29-001 (July 17,
1998) (another casino meals case, and not Boyd Gaming Corp. due to footnote
eleven).
251 See I.R.C. § 132()(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e) (1992).
252 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-29-026 (July 20,1990).
253 The Service was construing Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e)(4) (1989). See also I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-30-029 (July 29, 1994) (favorable ruling on joint employer lessees of
an athletic facility).
254 See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
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terms of the statute which requires that "substantially all the use"' 255 of
the facility be by employees. The Service rejected the taxpayer
argument that the regulation barring all sales of memberships to the
general public257 was invalid. The regulations otherwise encourage
exclusive arrangements, by declining to apply nondiscrimination rules
to on-premises athletic facilities.
IV. EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY FOR SECTION 132
At the time of the enactment of DRA 1984's fringe benefit
provisions, the stated expectations of the leaders of the Senate and
House tax legislation committees differed. Chairman of the House
Ways & Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski, emphasized both the
exclusionary and inclusionary aspects:
[T]he conference agreement sets forth statutory provisions
under which certain employer-provided fringe benefits are
excluded from the employee's gross taxable income and the
wage base for withholding purposes, while fringe benefits not
so excluded or otherwise excluded by other fringe benefit
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code generally would be
included at the excess of fair market value over amounts paid
by the employee. 9
Senator Robert Dole, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
focused only on the exclusions: "The conference agreement provides
an exclusion from income and social security taxes for certain
employer-provided goods, and services, such as no-additional cost
services, employee discounts, and de minimis fringe benefits."' 6°
255 I.R.C. § 132(j)(4)(B)(iii).
256 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (June 23, 1994), available at 1994 WL 1866293.
A subsequent field service advisory apparently pertains to this case, and it repeats the
position of the regulations that access to the facility cannot be made available to the
general public. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (May 27, 1997), available at 1997 WL
33314813.
257 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e)(1) (1992).
258 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(e)(5) (1992).
259 130 CONG. REC. H 7085, 7112 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2140, 2143.
260 Id. at S 8373 (statement of Sen. Robert J. Dole, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2140, 2168.
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Service Commissioner Roscoe L. Egger, Jr. provided an upbeat
assessment shortly following the enactment of DRA 1984:
For the first time in history, Congress made clear distinctions
between taxable and nontaxable fringe benefits with the
passage of the new tax law. You may not agree on every issue
with congressional interpretation but you must agree that this
261
first codification effort is a step in the right direction.
Commentators have expressed differing views of the legislation.
Professor Abreu has offered what might be the popular wisdom, that
"section 132 of the Code has made life easier for many tax advisors
because it has provided answers to many frequently asked
questions. ' '262 On the other hand, Professor Blasi characterized the
provisions as "a problematic statute ... [that] will make it difficult for
practitioners to provide clear and reliable guidance to their clients.,1
63
Professor Simon observed that "[a]ll of these [exclusions] are defined
in careful and elaborate detail, raising the question of whether these
new provisions are administrable.
264
To evaluate the successes or failures of the DRA 1984 fringe
benefit provisions, one might apply a list of desired outcomes - some
of which conflict with one another. The discussion that follows will
evaluate the accomplishment of the following objectives in light of the
administrative and judicial experience of the past twenty years: (a)
reducing overall complexity and taxpayer costs of compliance, (b)
improving taxpayer compliance, (c) increasing the efficiency of the
income tax system, (d) reducing the income tax regulation of
customary business practices, and (e) expanding the tax base for
salary compensation.
A. Reducing Overall Complexity and Taxpayer Costs of Compliance
It is probably a common assumption that, all other factors being
equal, simplicity is a desirable goal of a taxation system for a number
of obvious reasons such as encouraging self-compliance, supporting
transparency of application, aiding enforcement, and minimizing
261 See I.R.S. News Release IR-84-108 (Oct. 16, 1984).
262 Alice G. Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1355, 1403 n.140 (1996).
263 Ronald W. Blasi, Sweeping Changes in Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits
Create Opportunities and Problems, 13 TAX'N FOR LAW. 332, 339 (1985).
264 See Simon, supra note 87, at 912.
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compliance and other transaction costs. 265 A stated objective of the
DRA 1984 fringe benefits legislation was to introduce more certainty
266to the taxation of fringe benefits. Certainty of result can play a role
in reducing the overall complexity of the legal framework to all
affected parties in terms of complying with or enforcing the law.267
Complicated rules may be necessary to achieve certainty, but at a
price of less simplification. Simple but possibly arbitrary rules can
also improve certainty while reducing complexity, but other
268principles, such as fairness, may be sacrificed.
One commentator identified three types of complexity. A system
may be considered "complicated" if it "consist[s] of numerous and
detailed authorities.",269 A system may be complex as "intractable" if
it "rel[ies] on concepts that are difficult to apply., 270 Finally, a system
may be complex as "incoherent" if it "embod[ies] purposes that are
inconsistent with one another.,
271
The nonstatutory fringe benefit rules produced by DRA 1984 are
probably most complex in the first way - i.e., complicated. TheS • 272
roughly fifty pages of intricate regulations support this conclusion as
do the swell of administrative guidance noted earlier in this article,
273particularly in the transportation context. As far as the second
parameter of complexity, the rules require careful attention but are
probably not intractable. The rules are clearly complex in the third
way, because they are arbitrary in many respects. The principle of the
265 Sophisticated taxpayers, and their highly-compensated advisors, may prefer a
complex system, as well as other parties. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The E.L.
Wiegand Lecture: Administrability-Based Tax Simplification, 4 NEV. L.J. 573, 579
(2004) (discussing competing interests in the search for simplification). For a typical
discussion of tax policy goals such as simplicity and practicality, equality, fairness, and
neutrality published shortly after the enactment of DRA 1984, see Edward Yorio,
The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1255 (1985).
266 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
267 For a listing of a small slice of the voluminous scholarship identifying the
nature and causes of complexity in the U.S. taxation system, see Deborah L. Paul, The
Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform
Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151,153 n.3 (1997).
268 Fairness is often measured in terms of horizontal or vertical equity. See infra
notes 351, 353.
269 Paul, supra note 267, at 157.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 158.
272 See supra note 105.
273 See supra notes 124-70 and accompanying text.
1026 [Vol. 25:977
Internal Revenue Code Section 132
working condition fringe, that we ignore "wash" amounts, is easy to
express and understand. The de minimis fringe benefit, although
difficult to quantify, also makes practical sense. The special rules,
however, for employee discounts and no-additional-cost services, for
"demonstrator" automobiles, for employer-provided cafeterias and
athletic facilities, and for employee product testing convey the
impression that the taxability of one's total compensation package is
in large part a function of whether one works in an environment that
offers these particular types of tax-free fringes. Professor Shaller, for
example, has argued that several of the provisions, principally those
274dealing with no-additional-cost services and tuition reductions, are
arbitrary and conflict with the tax code's treatment of similar
benefits.275
The cost of complying with the fringe benefit provisions is
apparently significant. In a 2003 projection of taxpayer compliance
burdens under the fringe benefit regulations and the substantiation of
business travel, entertainment, and gifts, the Service estimated that
there were 28,582,150 respondents or record-keepers under those
provisions, and the estimated total reporting or recordkeeping burden
276was a stunning 37,922,688 hours. We do not have estimates of these
costs prior to DRA 1984 to make comparisons, and some of these
substantiation tasks probably existed prior to DRA 1984.
As compared with the previous seventy years, the overall post-
DRA 1984 fringe benefits taxation environment is more certain. We
have specific rules. Yes, it is probably more complicated, if measured
by the volume of Treasury regulations. In comparison, as discussed
earlier in this article, the body of administrative pronouncements
prior to DRA 1984 consisted of a handful of very old revenue rulings
277and several regulations, one of which was directed at the
employment tax consequences rather than the direct income tax
278consequences to the employee. The transportation area has
generated a significant number of private letter rulings, revenue
274 DRA 1984 enacted current I.R.C. § 117(d), which provides an exemption for
tuition reductions for faculty and certain family members. That exemption is beyond
the scope of this article.
275 See Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A
Codification of Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 425 (1985).
276 See Dep't of the Treasury, Notices, Submission for OMB Review, 68 Fed.
Reg. 37,202 (June 23, 2003).
277 See supra notes 25-83 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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279
rulings, and technical advice memoranda. The other areas
combined have generated fewer items of guidance. Judicial opinions
thoroughly examining the operation of the fringe benefits rules are
280rare. The principal exceptions are the casino cafeteria meals cases
and the airline travel allowance cases2s' - all of which shared the
common thread of being focused on the employer in terms of
assessing additional employment taxes or denying a business
deduction for the benefit.
In the absence of an in-depth empirical study of actual income tax
disputes, not limited to those that are reported, one can only offer
reasonable speculations about the underlying reasons for the apparent
dearth of cases. There are several possible explanations.
First, the reported cases are only a small slice of the overall
enforcement activity. There are audits that are settled without judicial
2812action being initiated. Although aggregate statistics are available
from the Service concerning the number and types of returns audited,
the claimed additional tax, and so forth, those statistics are not broken
down by the issue in question.283
Second, the Service may not be vigorously enforcing this area.
That aspect is discussed in the next section.2 4
Third, because the focus of the reported decisions and private
letter rulings is the employer's employment tax liability or the
employer's income tax deduction, that could decrease the pool of
potential litigants, as compared with questions arising from individual
taxpayers. For example, for calendar year 2003, 130,134,277
individual income tax returns were filed, as compared with 2,394,271
281corporate returns and 30,121,088 employment tax returns. One
commentator has observed that the amount of tax litigation should
279 See supra notes 124-70 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 107.
282 See, e.g., John R. Gardner & Benjamin R. Norman, Effects of the Shift in the
Burden of Proof in the Disposition of Tax Cases, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1357,
1372-74 (2003) (discussing theory that expected outcomes of litigation impact
whether a case is filed).
281 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TABLE 10, EXAMINATION COVERAGE:
RECOMMENDED AND AVERAGE RECOMMENDED ADDITIONAL TAX AFTER
EXAMINATION, BY TYPE AND SIZE OF RETURN, FISCAL YEAR 2004,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04dbl0ex.xls (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter
AUDIT STATISTICS].
28 See infra notes 290-324 and accompanying text.
285 AUDIT STATISTICS, supra note 283.
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increase along with the amount of tax revenue involved. It should
also increase with fewer taxpayers affected by the tax, as that
increases their stake in the matter.286 Both of these propositions
would be consistent with the relative lack of litigation. The amount of
foregone tax revenue lost through nonstatutory fringe benefit
exclusions is relatively minor. 21' Also, although the number of
employers and employment tax returns is smaller than the number of
individual taxpayers, the issue of nonstatutory fringe benefits
potentially impacts all employers, of course to varying degrees, so the
affected taxpayers are probably not a select class.
Finally, litigation can decrease if there is nothing in controversy,
because the law is so clear or it creates such broad exclusions that
there are few points of dispute between taxpayers and the Service.
The significant number of administrative pronouncements in the area
of transportation belies the argument of great clarity, but those
pronouncements largely deal with the highly factual applied issues of
vehicle types and driver responsibilities in the qualified nonpersonal
28use vehicle area. Particularly with personal usage of employer-
provided vehicles, one would expect continuing compliance issues due
to the recordkeeping that is involved. However, beyond that, as
discussed later, it could indeed be argued that section 132 leaves little
in contention.289
B. Improving Taxpayer Compliance
As discussed earlier in this article, the focus of cases and private
letter ruling requests strongly emphasizes the employer's taxS •• 290
liability. For calendar year 2003, 30,121,088 employment tax returns
291
were filed, and 17,698, or 0.06%, were audited.
An October 1993 Service study of employment tax compliance
does not suggest that the Service views the fringe benefit issue as a
292major factor in taxpayer noncompliance. In the study, the "gross
employment tax gap.., is the aggregate amount of that year's tax
286 See Paul, supra note 267, at 171-76.
287 See infra notes 373-75 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
289 See infra notes 349-95 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
291 See AUDIT STATISTICS, supra note 283.
292 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., RESEARCH Div., PUB. NO. 1415-E, FEDERAL
TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: GROSS AND NET EMPLOYMENT TAX GAP ESTIMATES
FOR 1984-1997 (1993). http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p1415e93.pdf.
2006] 1029
Virginia Tax Review
liability that is not paid voluntarily., 293 That gap is comprised of a
''reporting gap" ("the amount of tax liability that taxpayers do not
voluntarily report, 294) and a "remittance gap" ("the amount that
taxpayers report on their returns as due, but which is not voluntarily
paid" 295). The reporting gap is in turn divided into underreported or
misreported earnings and math errors. The study focused on 1987,
and found that the noncompliance rate for employment taxes was
11%, as compared with 18.6% and 18.9% for individual and corporate
296taxes, respectively. Of the gross employment tax gap for that year,
78% was due to a reporting gap and 22% was attributable to a
remittance gap.297 However, the overall noncompliance percentages
were much higher for self-employment taxes, and the noncompliance
percentages for employer taxes, such as FICA and FUTA, were much
298smaller, 4.5% and 7.6%, respectively.
Focusing on FICA, the underreporting of wages and salaries
(other than tip income) accounted for thirty percent of the FICA
gross employment tax gap. 299 In turn, ninty-four percent of the
underreported wage and salary portion of the FICA tax gap was
attributable to classification of employees, leaving only six percent,
$200 million, attributable to underreporting of wages of employees for
whom employment status is not an issue.
The 1993 Service study provides estimates for tax year 1984 as
well as post-DRA 1984 years. The noncompliance rate was projected
301as decreasing slightly, from 11.5% in 1984 to 10.2% by 1997.
However, the gross tax gap was projected to increase from $18.9
billion in 1984 to $50.2 billion in 1997.302 The study explains that
"[t]hese projections reflect estimated changes in the tax base and tax
rates over time rather than changes in taxpayer behavior because in
developing the estimates the voluntary reporting rates were assumed
to remain constant., 30 3 The changes in the tax base described in an
appendix to the study do not include any reference to a different
293 Id. at 2.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 7.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 8.
299 Id. at 9.
300 Id at 9-10.
301 Id. at 11.
302 Id.
303 Id. at 12.
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treatment of fringe benefits. Indeed, the study does not anywhere
mention fringe benefits. Perhaps this expects too much of the
employment tax as a proxy for fringe benefit reporting compliance.
In 1985 Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., the Service Commissioner,
observed:
[A]s a tax administrator, let me just say this: I can walk you
through just about any district's examination of personal or
corporate cases where auto expenses are at issue and the
result will be the same - big adjustments. In most cases,
records simply don't exist and taxpayers must reconstruct
information about their use of autos, aircraft, etc. for tax
purposes. This procedure is time-consuming and, only in rare
cases, verifies the amount claimed on the tax return.
As discussed earlier, transportation issues occupy a significant part of
the post-DRA 1984 regulatory environment,3 5 so these compliance
issues may be continuing.
The income tax treatment of executive perks and fringe benefits is
a special aspect of the compliance picture. The author of a book that
criticized the lenient tax treatment of executive perks wrote as of 2003
that "[t]he IRS says it has no policy on whether to examine such
executive [travel] expenses at large companies. However, in dozens of
interviews over the past six years not one IRS auditor who examines
corporate tax returns could recall examining the expense accounts of a
chief executive."
306
Reportedly, a Service spokesman indicated in March 2005 that the
Service is reviewing the personal income tax returns of executives
when their company is audited, and fringe benefits is one area of
potential abuse that is to be scrutinized. 37 Further, in spring 2005 the
Service issued an "Executive Compensation-Fringe Benefits Audit
Techniques Guide (02-2005)."' 08 The guide is significant in several
respects.
First, it might suggest an increased enforcement effort by the
Service in the overall area of executive compensation. At roughly the
304 See I.R.S. News Release IR-85-25 (Mar. 13, 1985).
305 See supra notes 124-70 and accompanying text.
306 JOHNSTON, supra note 156, at 67-68.
307 See IRS Boosts Scrutiny of Exec Pay, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,2005, at C4.
308 See Internal Revenue Serv., Executive Compensation-Fringe Benefits Audit
Techniques Guide (02-2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/
0,,id=134943,00.html (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter Service Audit Guide].
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same time, the Service issued separate audit guides for stock-based
compensation arrangements, 30 9 excess compensation under section
162(m),310  golden parachute payments,31 ' nonqualified deferred1 12 •313
compensation plans, split dollar life insurance, and transfers of
compensatory stock options.
314
Second, while much of the guide is a fundamental exposition of
the applicable law, in places it offers examples of taxpayer situations
that have arisen, providing a clue as to the type of compliance issues
that are being encountered. "Although many corporations are aware
of the law regarding the deductibility of club dues and membership
fees, they will often make such expenditures and disguise the
deduction." '315  "Top level executives are permitted to use the
[corporate credit] card at will. A monthly statement may be mailed
directly to the corporation and the account may be paid in full without
the submission of a business expense report., 31 6 "Upon examination it
has been found that homes of executives have been fortified with
special rooms or other security devises [sic]. It is important to
evaluate the level of security afforded top executives and their
families to determine that security studies3 7 are being followed."318
309 See Internal Revenue Serv., Stock Based Compensation Audit Techniques
Guide (02-2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=134892,00
.html (last visited July 31, 2005).
310 See Internal Revenue Serv., Section 162(m) Audit Techniques Guide (02-
2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=134874,00.html (last
visited July 31, 2005).
311 See Internal Revenue Serv., Golden Parachute Audit Techniques Guide (02-
2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=134890,00.html (last
visited July 31, 2005).
312 See Internal Revenue Serv., Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Audit
Techniques Guide (02-2005).,http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/O,,id
=134878,00.html (last visited July 31, 2005).
313 See Internal Revenue Serv., Split Dollar Life Insurance Audit Technique
Guide (03-2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/O,,id=136548,00
.html (last visited July 31, 2005).
314 See Internal Revenue Serv., Transfers of Compensatory Stock Options to
Related Persons Audit Techniques Guide (02-2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/article/0,,id=134893,00.html (last visited July 31, 2005).
315 Service Audit Guide, supra note 308, at 2.
316 Id.
317 The regulations provide that the cost of security measures for transportation
can be excluded if certain conditions are satisfied, including a recommendation of
such measures by a security study. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(m) (2001). It is assumed
that although the regulations do not address it, this working condition fringe exclusion
can be expanded to an employee's living quarters as well. See, e.g., Marianna G.
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"Executives generally maintain a home office that may be furnished
by the corporation. Sometimes upon termination of employment the
furnishings and equipment are transferred to the executive as part of
their severance package."3 9  Regarding SIFL3 20 calculations for the
personal use of employer aircraft, "these amounts are often computed
incorrectly."
321
The Service anecdotes suggest a mixture of outright intentional
avoidance, inattention to substantiation requirements, and simple
errors in calculating the fringe benefits. The issues appear to involve
routine compliance and enforcement, rather than issues that stretch
the applicable exclusions or demand statutory revision.3
323Federal security law disclosures provide some sense of the types
of common executive perks. A review of the proxy statements filed in
2005 by the 100 largest U.S. public companies found that personal use
of company aircraft was the most frequently disclosed perk, followed
324by financial planning, and tax or other professional services.
Dyson, The Fringe Benefit Rules Applicable to Protecting Executives, 53 TAX
EXECUTIVE 449,452 (2001).
"8 Service Audit Guide, supra note 308, at 5.
9 Id. at 6. Reportedly, Universal Studios spent in excess of $1.7 million to build
a screening room at the CEO's home. With the CEO's departure, he was supposed to
purchase it from the company or Universal would remove it. See Adam Bryant, A
Little Icing on Top, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1999, at 54.
"0 See supra notes 149-162 and accompanying text.
321 Service Audit Guide, supra note 308, at 7.
322 The employer's deduction for employee personal use of aircraft was, however,
a situation that demanded a statutory fix. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying
text.
323 Noncash fringe benefits will generally fall into the "other compensation"
category that must be disclosed in proxy materials if the aggregate amount of such
"perquisites and other personal benefits" for an executive officer exceeds the lesser of
$50,000 or ten percent of the cash compensation paid to such executive. If the
amount of a particular fringe benefit exceeds twenty-five percent of total other
compensation paid to a named executive officer the nature of the item must be
disclosed in a footnote. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2005). On February 8, 2006, the
Securities and Exchange Commission proposed extensive amendments to the
disclosure requirements for executive and director compensation, including a
reduction to $10,000 of the minimum amount of perquisites and other personal
benefits that must be disclosed. See Proposed Rules, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (Feb. 8, 2006).
324 John C. Partigan, Perks: What 2005 Proxy Statements Reveal, FIN. EXECUTIVE,
July-Aug. 2005, at 22, 23. The author's table is not fully explained, but the reported
percentages are apparently the percent of companies disclosing a particular item, as
opposed to the percentage of total reported other compensation that such item
represents. For an interesting argument that perks can discourage improper
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Personal use of a company car and driver, a leased car or car
allowance, club membership, personal use of company apartment or
housing assistance, and home security systems were of roughly equal
frequency. Although the aggregate list omits a lot of details, the
nature of the perks suggests rather routine income tax issues
consistent with those appearing in the Service anecdotes discussed
earlier.
C. Increasing the Efficiency of the Income Tax System
Tax-free fringe benefits offer the powerful combination of a tax
deduction at the employer's level, coupled with an exclusion from
taxable gross income at the employee's level. An employer can
receive an income tax deduction for other compensation, such as cash
wages, so the income tax deduction for fringe benefits is not unique in
that respect. However, all other things being equal, if an employee
places the same value on a tax-free benefit as a taxable benefit after
tax, the employer should be able to pay a lesser amount of overall
benefits using a package of nontaxable and taxable compensation as
compared with a package comprised solely of taxable compensation.
If that is the case, the employer might "capture" the implicit income
tax subsidy, rather than the employee.
This assumes that the employee places a greater value on the tax-
free benefit, than the taxable benefit, after-tax. It could be that the
employee would rather have the taxable compensation (usually cash)
that can be spent anywhere, rather than the usually in-kind tax-free
fringe benefit, if it were not for the added incentive of the income tax
exclusion.
employee behavior, see M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin:
A Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J.
1835 (2005).
325 See, e.g., Hale E. Sheppard, Perpetuation of the Foreign Earned Income
Exclusion: U.S. International Tax Policy, Political Reality, and the Necessity of
Understanding How the Two Intertwine, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 727, 744 (2004)
(arguing that the benefit of the section 911 foreign earned income exclusion is
captured by corporate employers to reduce overseas wages); see also Jeffrey S. Zax,
Fringe Benefits, Income Tax Exemptions, and Implicit Subsidies, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 171
(1988) (comparing models where the tax subsidy accrued entirely to the employer, or
alternatively, to the employee); cf. Mary E. O'Connell, Contingent Lives: The
Economic Insecurity of Contingent Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 889, 912 (1995)
(suggesting that the subsidy is enjoyed by the employee, increasing with the worker's
income tax rate).
Internal Revenue Code Section 132
Accordingly, the argument is often made that tax-free fringe
benefits can be inefficient because they encourage the over-
consumption of the fringe benefit in question because the price isS.• 1326
subsidized. If one accepts the premise that the efficiency of the
income tax system can, in part, be judged by this standard, then
efficiency would be increased if section 132 had the impact of limiting
exclusions, so that taxable compensation and otherwise tax-free fringe
benefits would be placed on the same comparative basis when
employers and employees bargain over compensation packages.
This article later discusses whether DRA 1984 did expand the•• 327
taxable base in terms of fringe benefit compensation. If it did not
accomplish that to any significant degree, then improved efficiency
would not be achieved.
D. Reducing the Income Tax Regulation of Customary Business
Practices
The focus of fringe benefit reform proposals is often on the
income tax treatment of employees, rather than employers. However,
one must be mindful that the employer may benefit from the tax
exemption for fringe benefits if it permits the employer to reduce the
amount of the overall compensation package.328 If a tax were imposed
on the recipient of otherwise nontaxable fringe benefits, it might
follow that the employers' overall compensation costs would rise.
Those compensation costs could be increased in a more direct. . 329
fashion by limiting the employer's deduction, as an application of
the "surrogate taxation" principle.3 Alternatively, some countries
have imposed a separate fringe benefits tax on the employer."' From
326 See, e.g., RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 207-08 (2004) (summarizing the deadweight loss argument).
327 See infra notes 349-95 and accompanying text.
328 See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
329 Some might argue that permitting a business deduction for any first class or
business class premium airfare, for example, is excessive as a matter of policy and
should be denied. The Code already includes some restrictions of this nature. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 274(a)(3) (no deduction for club dues), (k)(1) (no deduction for meals
that are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances), (n) (fifty percent limit on
meal and entertainment expenses); 280F (limitation on depreciation for "luxury"
automobiles).
330 See, e.g., SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 326, at 97-99 (summarizing
surrogate taxation).
331 See, e.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME
TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 174-76 (2d ed. 2004) (summarizing the
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an administrability standpoint, there is some benefit from imposing a
tax on fringe benefits on the employer, as a single payer and reporting
person, as an alternative to taxing the employee. That might already
be the practical result in some respect, with the focus of Service
oversight tending to be on the employer in terms of employment tax
liability on account of fringe benefits.332 Implementation of such limits
would involve the employer's compliance, either in preparation of its
income tax return, preparation of information returns for employees
(such as the well-known Form W-2), or both. The employer is an
unavoidable part of the tax administration structure.
There should be a common sense quality to the rules, so that the
tax code does not hinder common workplace interactions that do not
have a compensatory role. For example, with respect to carpools, the
Service very early ruled that the participants did not recognize income• 333
from reimbursements, nor could they claim deductions. There
should be a practical quality to the rules, to minimize employer
recordkeeping and reporting where the amounts in question are not
significant.
The exemptions for de minimis fringes and working condition
fringes are both responses to employer recordkeeping concerns. The
de minimis fringe regulations speak to this directly. "The term 'de
minimis fringe' means any property or service the value of which is
(after taking into account the frequency with which similar fringes are
provided by the employer to the employer's employees) so small as to
make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively
impracticable., 334 The working condition fringe benefit, by assuming a
hypothetical offsetting deduction by the employee, permits the
employer to simply deduct the amount without reporting it as income
to the employee. 35 The employee benefits in both situations, because
the de minimis fringe benefit is tax free absolutely, and the working
condition fringe benefit is as well, even though the employee could
not have actually claimed the hypothetical offsetting deduction in
full. 336 Even Professor Shaller's critical assessment of section 132 still
Australian employer fringe benefits tax); Lee Burns, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REv. 39,
40 (1999) (an employer tax on fringe benefits was adopted in New Zealand, Australia,
Malawi, Lesotho, Estonia, and the Philippines).
332 See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
333 See Rev. Rul. 55-555, 1955-2 C.B. 20.
334 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(a) (1992).
335 See supra notes 67-83, 199-206 and accompanying text.
336 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(vi) (2001) (the two percent limitation of I.R.C.
§ 67(a) is not considered for this purpose).
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finds some justification for exclusions for working condition fringe
benefits and de minimis fringe benefits.337 Professor Simon's proposal
for including most fringe benefits in income also would permit
exclusions for working conditions338 and de minimis fringe benefits.339
However, recordkeeping cannot be eliminated even in these
situations. Cash payments to an employee generally do not qualify for
exclusion unless the employee verifies that the cash was used for
340qualifying expenses, and the employee returns any unused funds.
Flat allowances based on hours worked have generally not been
accepted by the Service, probably due to their potential for abuse as a
simple cash salary supplement. 34' The Service, however, has accepted
flat dollar allowances in limited amounts as satisfying the
substantiation requirement if special circumstances make
342substantiation impractical.
Other deductions, such as employee use of motor vehicles or
aircraft, probably defy a bright-line rule which would deny all
employer deductions, on the one hand, or ignore all employee use, on
the other hand. This takes us back to requirements that separate
"pure" business use from personal use, such as the current system of
"qualified nonpersonal use vehicles ' 343 and the SIFL regulations
discussed earlier.34
Dissatisfaction with the complexities of such line drawing can
produce calls for simplification, often utilizing a different tax base. To
accomplish simplification that tax base will need to be different from
that of the current system. For example, the single tax rate aspect of
most so-called "flat tax" proposals is a small part of a larger proposal
that usually includes a different tax base.345 The issue of the role of
337 See Shaller, supra note 275, at 426.
338 She would include a further limitation "other than items which are lavish or
extravagant under the circumstances." See Simon, supra note 87, at 949.
339 Id. at 950-51.
340 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(v) (2001).
341 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2005-52, 2005-35 I.R.B. 423 (cash allowances to mechanics
for tool costs not substantiated); Rev. Rut. 2002-35, 2002-1 C.B. 1067 (cash allowances
to pipeline workers for rig costs not substantiated).
342 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2005-59, 2005-35 I.R.B. 443 (deemed substantiation
rules for pipeline workers); Rev. Proc. 2002-41, 2002-1 C.B. 1098.
343 See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
345 "If the devil is in the details, then the tax base is the devil in any tax system,
for the complexity of a tax system is generally proportional to the difficulty of
determining its base." Abreu, supra note 262, at 1356.
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fringe benefits within that structure would not be eliminated,
however. W A very explicit consumption-based tax such as a national
sales tax could skirt many of these issues, but it would still need to
grapple with the role of fringe benefits that are a substitute for
personal consumption.
Indeed, after summarizing the taxation of employee fringe
benefits in the United States, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands,
France, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the authors of a
comparative taxation treatise observed that "[w]hile the contours of
the rules differ, most of the systems... allow substantial amounts of
employment income in the form of fringe benefits to escape tax
because of the administrative and valuation problems which are
involved in taxing such benefits."348
E. Expanding the Tax Base for Salary Compensation
Achieving a so-called "comprehensive tax base" has been a
recurring theme in academic discussion. 49 A comprehensive tax base
346 The so-called "Armey Flat Tax" would exclude noncash fringe benefits from
the employee's income, but deny a deduction to the employer. Id. at 1372. The so-
called "Nunn-Domenici Tax" also addresses fringe benefits, excluding some from the
employee's income and potentially including others. Id. at 1374. Both proposals
would need to identify what types of noncash benefits are subject to treatment, so the
classification issue under current law remains an issue. Id. at 1402-03. Classification
issues aside, this is not to say that tax proposals would not change the benefits
calculus in employee versus employer negotiations. Professor Abreu, for example,
proposes that the Armey Flat Tax would create an employer preference for cash
wages (which would be deductible) over noncash compensation (which would not be
deductible). Id. at 1389-90. For recent discussions of various alternative tax base
proposals, see Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and
the Top One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg, E-Tax:
Fundamental Tax Reform and the Transition to a Currency-Free Economy, 20 VA.
TAX REV. 1 (2000); David A. Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot?, 56 SMU L.
REV. 201 (2003); CONG. RES. SERV., NEW TAx PROPOSALS: FLAT, VAT, AND
VARIATIONS, CRS 92-386 (1992), available at 1992 WL 699715; CONG. RES. SERV.,
FLAT TAX PROPOSALS AND FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: AN OVERVIEW, CRS
IB95060 (1998), available at 1998 WL 845787.
7 A retail sales tax on goods or services, could, of course, be circumvented
through employee discounts, no-additional-cost services, de minimis fringes, and so
forth.
34' See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 331, at 174.
349 The number of articles that at least refer to this phrase defy a thorough list.
For the leading summary of the competing arguments, see Boris I. Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925
(1967).
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can produce an assortment of results, including a reduction in nominal
350 . 31 . 352
rates, increased horizontal equity,"' increased economic efficiency,
and a more progressive taxation structure.353 Some commentators
conclude that a comprehensive inclusionary treatment of fringe
benefits, including many statutory benefits, is appropriate.354
DRA 1984 added "fringe benefits" to the examples of types of
income included by section 61. It was acknowledged by Congress that
section 61 did not require this change to increase its breadth ofI. .• 351
application. With the uncertainty concerning the taxation of fringe
benefits lifted by adoption of the specific exclusions of section 132,
however, one might have expected some expansion of the gross
income tax base with respect to fringe benefits.
Except with respect to routine payments of meal allowances for
which the exclusion is now narrower,3 6 there is no discernible increase
in the breadth of taxable gross income. A widespread employee
fringe benefit, frequent flyer awards retained for personal use, has
remained untouched.357 Cash rewards from the use of personal credit
350 For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation's explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 claimed that "[w]ith the adoption of... [the passive activity loss]
restrictions, the elimination of other preferences, and other base-broadening
provisions, the Act sharply reduces the top individual tax rate from 50 percent to 28
percent, while leaving the tax burden of the highest income groups essentially
unchanged." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 7 (Joint Comm. Print 1987).
15' This is simply the principle "that individuals with similar incomes pay similar
amounts of tax." Id. The receipt of tax-free fringe benefit income by some
employees and taxable compensation income by others may violate this principle, but
depending upon the nature of the fringe benefit in question, there is uncertainty as to
whether the two situations are comparable enough to make this claim.
151 See supra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
... This concept is also referred to as "vertical equity." If an otherwise excluded
item is enjoyed by upper income taxpayers more widely than lower income taxpayers,
taxing that item will increase the effective rate of tax applied to upper income
taxpayers.
151 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 87, at 922-47 (proposing that section 83 be applied
to most fringe benefits).
155 See supra note 11.
116 See supra notes 223-35 and accompanying text.
357 In a 1993 private letter ruling requested by an airline, the Service ruled that
the airline was not required to file information returns in connection with awards
earned by travelers under its frequent flyer program. However, the Service did note
that employees could realize taxable gross income if the employee received a cash
award in connection with employer-purchased tickets. The ruling does not directly
address the income tax treatment of an employee's receipt of a free ticket on account
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cards for business purchases also appear untouched. Judging by the
cases and administrative pronouncements that have been a focus of
Service enforcement measures, the meal allowances are most
important to union workers employed by utilities and airlines. While
this base broadening does achieve a measure of horizontal equity and
an increase in tax revenues (including Social Security and Medicare
taxes), it would seem to have a negative impact on vertical equity if it
tends to impact lower to middle income taxpayers.
Another reason for the absence of an expansion is Congress's
penchant for adding to the exclusions. Since the enactment of section
132 in 1984, it has been amended on eleven occasions. 9 Although the
of employer-purchased travel. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-40-007 (Oct. 8, 1993). In
1995, the Service indicated that employee frequent flier awards could produce taxable
income. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-47-001 (Nov. 24, 1995). It later announced,
'however, that it would not pursue this issue if the employee does not convert the
awards to cash. See Ann. 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 621. One taxpayer did manage to
produce taxable income by selling the awards to his employer (a corporation
controlled by him and his wife) in a convoluted scheme. The court did not reach the
issue of whether the accumulation of frequent flyer miles constitute gross income, and
it instead focused on the taxpayer's sale of property in which he had a basis of zero.
See Charley v. Commissioner, 91 F.3d 72 (9th Cir. 1996). The treatment of frequent
flyer awards is beyond the scope of this article. For a concise summary of the
practical reporting and enforcement issues presented if such awards were taxable, see
SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 326, at 218. Members of Congress earn
frequent flyer miles on trips that are paid for by private parties or the federal
government, and accounting for those benefits has drawn some criticism. See Larry
Margasak & Sharon Theimer, Congress' Frequent Flying in Question, DAILY
CAMERA, July 18, 2005, at B1.
358 As a practical matter it would be difficult to enforce this unless employers
would reimburse only employer-linked credit cards and not personal cards. That
seems like a very awkward requirement to impose on taxpayers.
359 See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-272, § 13207(b)(1), (c)(1), 100 Stat. 82, 319-21 (1986); Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1114(b)(5), 1151(e)(2)(A), (g)(5), 1853(a), 1899A(5), 100 Stat.
2085, 2451, 2506-07, 2870, 2958; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, §§ 1011B(a)(31)(B), 6066(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3488, 3702-03;
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §§ 7101(b),
7841(d)(7), (d)(19), 103 Stat. 2106, 2304-05, 2428-29; Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-486, § 1911 (a)-(c), 106 Stat. 2776, 3012-14; Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13101(b), 13201(b)(3)(F), 13213(d),
107 Stat. 312, 420, 459, 474-75; Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§§ 970, 1072, 111 Stat. 788, 897, 948; Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,
Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 9010, 112 Stat. 107, 507-08 (1998); Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 665, 115 Stat. 38, 143; Military
Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 103(a), (b), 117 Stat. 1335,
1337-38; Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 207(13),
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amendments run the gamut, from expansions of the exclusions to fine,
technical tinkering, at least seven 360 of the amendments could be
considered as broadening the exclusions.
For example, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1985, expanded the no-additional-cost service exclusion as
applied to airlines by adding what is currently section 132(h)(3),
permitting parents of an airline employee to use free tickets without
generating taxable gross income to the employee or the parent. 361 The
Tax Reform Act of 1986, in addition to making other technical
362
changes, further enlarged the air transportation exclusion. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 made significant changes with respect to
transportation fringes, elevating them from part of the de minimis
fringe benefit, 363 and a working condition fringe for employer-36436
provided parking, to a separate comprehensive subsection. 36' The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 modified the de minimis fringe benefit
for employee eating facilities by adding a sentence that an employee
entitled to exclude the meal under section 119 is considered as having
paid an amount for such meal equal to the meal's attributable share of
118 Stat. 1166, 1177.
360 An expanded exclusion not discussed in the text is a benefit for military
families with respect to base closure aid, see I.R.C. § 132(n), added by the Military
Family Tax Relief Act of 2003.
361 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 § 13207(a)(1).
362 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986 §1114(b)(5)(B) (adding current I.R.C.
§ 132(j)(6), providing that air cargo transportation is the same service as passenger
transportation). This amendment would permit a Federal Express employee, for
example, to fly on commercial passenger airlines if there is a reciprocal arrangement.
It could also permit Federal Express employees to hitch personal rides on Federal
Express cargo planes as a no-additional-cost fringe. This responded to a Service
private letter ruling finding that such rides produced taxable gross income. See supra
notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
363 See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6T(d)(1) (1989) ($15 monthly de minimis exclusion for
transit passes).
364 I.R.C. §132(h)(4) as enacted by DRA 1984 had provided that "parking
provided to an employee on or near the business premises of the employer" was a
working condition fringe. That provision was found at I.R.C. § 132(i)(4) at the time
of its elimination by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 which included such parking as
part of a broader 'qualified transportation fringe" in current I.R.C. § 132(f)(1).
365 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(a), (b), 106 Stat.
2776, 3012-14 (adding current I.R.C. § 132(a)(5), (f)). The exclusion for
transportation provided to employees in a "commuter highway vehicle" (essentially a
van) provided by I.R.C. 132(f)(1)(A) had been previously provided by I.R.C. § 124
that was repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, § 11801(a)(9), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-520.
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the facility's direct operating costs.3 66 The Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century significantly revisited the qualified transportation
fringe. Most notably, an amendment permitted employees to make a
cash or in-kind election with respect to transportation fringes, yet not
367be considered in constructive receipt of income. This was the
impetus for later rulings permitting employees to set aside pre-tax
amounts for parking.36s The legislation also increased the dollar caps
on the amount of excludable benefits.( 9 Based on tax expenditures
estimates, the qualified transportation fringes are the most costly
provisions under section 132.370 The Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 added a new exclusion for
371retirement planning advice or information provided to employees.
As judged by the experience with section 132, it is probably a fair
statement that Congress has not yet demonstrated much enthusiasm
for broader inclusion of nonstatutory fringe benefits. Because any
inclusions would fall on wage earners, adherents to vertical equity
principles might demand the traditional prescription of phase-outs of
exclusions based on income caps.372  The fiscal reality is that the
nonstatutory fringes that could be taxed as a practical matter probably
don't represent much in terms of foregone tax revenues. The
projected loss of revenues produced by the enactment of section 132,
which in large part continued the status quo, was less than $5
366 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 970(a), 111 Stat. 788, 897
(adding the last sentence of current I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)). This was a factor in the
casino meals litigation discussed at supra notes 242-50 and accompanying text.
367 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178,
§ 9010(a)(1), 112 Stat. 107, 507 (amending current I.R.C. § 132(f)(4)). The
constructive income issue remains an abiding concern in other compensation contexts.
See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-01-005 (Jan. 6, 2006) (employees who do not
participate in a leave donation program will not have gross income merely because
they have the ability to participate in the program).
368 See supra note 164.
369 See Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, § 9010(b)(2)(A)-(B),
(c)(1) (in tandem establishing the current dollar limits in I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)).
370 See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
371 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 665(a), (b), 115 Stat. 38, 143 (adding current I.R.C. §132(a)(7), (m),
respectively).
372 One approach is to place overall caps on the amount of excludable fringe
benefits, or a single per employee cap on all fringe benefits, so that employees could
pick and choose among benefits in a cafeteria style. See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. 1105,
1105 (extension of remarks of Rep. Willis D. Gradison, Jr. suggesting cap limits on
each fringe or a single cap on the total value of all fringes offered to each employee).
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million 3  Based on recent tax expenditures estimates, the 2005
revenue losses for selected exclusions were modest: the exclusion for
reimbursed employee parking expenses cost $2.59 billion; the
exclusion for employer-provided transit passes cost $480 million; and,
the exclusion of employee meals and lodging (other than military)
cost $850 million. 4 The significant tax expenditures are elsewhere if
one focuses on compensation. The 2005 estimated revenue loss from
the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is, for example,
$112.6 billion.375 Politically speaking, attempting to increase the "wage
tax" on nonstatutory benefits is aggravating taxpayers for little gain in
fiscal terms, while impairing simplicity, administrability, or vertical
equity.
In fairness to DRA 1984, while it might not have expanded the
taxable compensation base, it might have contained the development
of further exclusions that would have pushed the boundaries of the
pre-DRA 1984 doctrine. One of the stated objectives of DRA 1984
was to limit the erosion of the income tax base by the emergence of
"new practices.3 7 6  While the reported cases and administrative
pronouncements demonstrate little in the way of new innovations,
DRA 1984 might have nevertheless played a role in curbing their
growth.
It is difficult to anticipate changes in the workplace and how the
new developments fit into the regulatory picture. For example, due to
a competitive market for accountants, Ernst & Young reportedly
offers "a concierge service for employees too busy to run errands." '377
This is a new development for rank and file workers, but it would
373 See 1984 H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1109 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
697, 784.
374 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2006, at 318 (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/
pdf/spec.pdf.
17 Id. One proposal short of repealing the exclusion would tax all employer-paid
health insurance premiums but provide a refundable tax credit for twenty percent of
the premiums, with the eligible premiums capped at $350 and $170 per month for
family coverage and individual coverage, respectively. This was projected to save
$112.2 billion annually by fiscal year 2002. See U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/OCG-97-2, ADDRESSING THE DEFICIT: BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF
SELECTED GAO WORK FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998, at 334 (1997), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/cg97002.pdf.
376 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
377 See Accountants, Kings Among Graduates, CHINA DAILY, June 7, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 9026560.
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seem that the de minimis fringe benefit exclusion is the closest fit. It
has been reported that more employers are offering lifestyle benefits
378to attract and retain employees that can include weight-loss classes,1 . 79
flexible schedule work hours, education opportunities, paid
sabbaticals, pet-friendly offices, telecommuting, on-site childcare,3 °
381 382on-site ATMs,"' take-home meals from the company cafeteria,38338
stress management courses, parenting and child-care seminars,3 4 on-
site visits from auto mechanics,3  reduced fees for gyms, athletic
teams, on-site flu shots and blood pressure checks,3s on-site concierge
services, weekly visits by chaplains,3 7 and casual dress. The taxation
of most, if not all, of those benefits can be resolved under section 132
or other sections of the Code, assuming that the employer
demonstrates the compliance tenacity necessary to sort through the
details.
Moving from the mundane office setting to more highly-
compensated and visible employees, professional athletes are
378 See, e.g., Doug McPherson, Frugal Employers Choose Pay-Less Perks,
DENVER POST, Apr. 17, 2005, at G1.
379 These may qualify as a working condition fringe if related to the employer's
trade or business, be excluded if part of an educational assistance plan, see I.R.C.
§ 127, be deductible as a trade or business expense, see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967),
or be eligible for a tuition credit, see I.R.C. § 25A.
380 I.R.C. § 129 permits up to a $5,000 exclusion from income for employer-
provided dependent care assistance. Amounts excluded from income are not eligible
for the dependent care credit of I.R.C. § 21. See I.R.C. § 129(e)(7). Arguably,
amounts in excess of the exclusion could be treated as amounts deemed paid by the
employee that would be eligible for the dependent care credit.
381 If this is just a matter of availability with no employer subsidy, this should not
be a taxable benefit.
... This can qualify as a de minimis fringe benefit under the regulations if the
meal was necessary to permit the employee to work overtime. See supra notes 223-35
and accompanying text. If the practice is instead taking home "leftovers," it would
seem that a de minimis fringe benefit is still appropriate if the practice is relatively
infrequent.
383 This might qualify as a working condition fringe.
384 Although not a working condition fringe, this could be a de minimis fringe
benefit.
385 If this is just a matter of availability with no employer subsidy, this should not
be a taxable benefit.
386 This might qualify as part of an employer health plan, excluded under I.R.C.
§ 106. See supra note 199.
W The employer's deduction, if any, might be scrutinized by the Service. See,
e.g., Trebilcock v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 852 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1, affd, 557
F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1977) (disallowing employer's deduction for payments to a
minister for services rendered to employees).
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reportedly courted by teams with an array of perks, some of which are
surely taxable, some of which are not. For example, one team
purchased a special $85,000 training machine for a player. That is a
clearly excludable working condition fringe benefit. A $250,000
annual reimbursement of a spouse's equestrian expenses was offered
another player.389 That would clearly be taxable. Round trip airfare
tickets between a player's hometown and the city in which the team is
based are offered.3'9 That too should be considered a personal, • 391
expense and a taxable fringe. For athletes, the housing perks start
with a private room for road trips, escalating to private suites on road
392trips, as compared with having roommates. It sounds like a working
condition fringe, even though it is a negotiated term, and even though
it discriminates among players.3 93 The list is seemingly endless, yet
manageable under established doctrine, including benefits such as
season tickets to athletic events and use of a particular uniform
number.3 94
What is striking about most, if not all, of these examples of
nonstatutory fringe benefits and perks is that none are particularly
surprising, or new. Moreover, most of them can be addressed through
applying established rules. Simple compliance with the rules is the
greater concern, not pushing the boundaries of what is or is not
income.395
388 See Troy E. Renck, Teams Percolating to Please Players, DENVER POST, Mar.
15, 2005, at 1D.
389 Id.
390 Id.
391 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing a case addressing
round-trip tickets for Alaskan oil field workers).
392 Renck, supra note 388.
393 An agent was quoted that "[y]oung guys always had roommates.., and
eventually you had veterans who wanted their (privacy)." Id. Working condition
fringes, like de minimis fringe benefits, have no general nondiscrimination
requirement.
394 Id. The season tickets may qualify as a no-additional-cost fringe for teams
with poor attendance, but would be taxable if the employer would suffer foregone
revenue or the entertainment is for another sport. The uniform number is one of
those tax-free workplace intangibles in an organization, much like a coveted corner
office.
395 See supra notes 290-324 and accompanying text (discussing anecdotes
concerning taxpayer compliance in the area of executive compensation).
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V. CONCLUSION
A review of the sparse guidance that was available to taxpayers
with respect to the income taxation treatment of nonstatutory fringe
benefits prior to the enactment of DRA 1984 demonstrates that
uncertainty was the state of affairs. Accordingly, DRA 1984 had a
low standard to surpass. While the 1984 legislation adopted rules for
the treatment of many fringe benefits, it did so largely by replicating,
albeit with more complexity, the de facto exclusions that had existed
prior to the legislation.
There has not been significant or particularly interesting litigation
of nonstatutory fringe benefit issues during the first two decades of
the post-DRA 1984 regime. The primary focus of the cases and
administrative pronouncements is on the employer's employment tax
liability, rather than directly on the employees' income tax treatment.
Taxpayers have been particularly active in requesting, and the Service
has been active in providing, guidance in the general area of
transportation, such as employer-provided vehicles and transportation
fringe benefits.
It is unclear whether the DRA 1984 provisions have achieved
other effects such as reduced overall complexity or increased taxpayer
compliance. Although there might have been an expectation that the
enactment of the DRA 1984 guidelines would focus Service scrutiny
on other nonstatutory fringe benefits outside the statutory exclusions,
that appears not to be the case. The case law and administrative
pronouncements do not demonstrate any new conceptions of taxable
fringe benefits or base broadening. However, the dearth of cases and
administrative pronouncements addressing new types of nonstatutory
fringe benefit compensation might suggest that section 132 has been
effective to some degree in controlling the expansion of such fringe
benefits. Nevertheless, the challenge to the Service appears to be in
assuring taxpayer compliance with the law as developed by DRA
1984.
